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I. INTRODUCTION1
The police pulled up to the Oregon nursing home with a search warrant 
signed by a county judge. Their suspect: a bed-ridden, 73-year-old man who also 
might be the elusive Golden State Killer who murdered 13 women and raped 
dozens more in the 1970s and 1980s. Without getting a warrant, law enforcement 
officers had narrowed their search for the killer using a public genealogy website 
with DNA2 test results uploaded by hundreds of thousands of people. Their final 
clue had been that this suspect—along with the Killer—had a genetic mutation 
1  This introduction is drawn from DNA Used in Hunt for Golden State Killer Previously Led 
to Wrong Man, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/dna-used-hunt-golden-state-killer-previously-led-wrong-man-n869796; and Benjamin 
Oreskes, et al., False Starts in Search for Golden State Killer Reveal the Pitfalls of DNA Testing, 
L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-golden-state-killer-
dna-20180504-story.html.
2  “DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is the genetic material found in the nucleus of cells, and 
is often referred to as the ‘blueprint of life.’ . . . The bases or components of DNA are four 
chemicals: Cytosine, Guanine, Thymine, Adenine.” Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The 
Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 143 
(2009). 
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possessed by less than 3% of Caucasians in the genealogy database. Without 
asking the man’s permission as he lay in bed, the police swabbed a DNA sample 
from his mouth and sent it for lab testing, comparing it to the DNA of the Golden 
State Killer found at a crime scene decades earlier. The result: no match; the man 
was innocent. The police tested a second suspect—also no match. Finally, on the 
third try, they got their man: Joseph De Angelo, an ex-cop now facing rape and 
murder charges and whose DNA matched the real killer. 
This story of mistaken identity, breath-taking DNA testing technology, 
and hard-boiled police work has become the first chapter in a series of 
increasingly common criminal investigations that rely on genetic samples tested 
by genealogy companies such as 23andMe and Ancestry, two of the most popular 
services, and loaded on public websites such as Ysearch or GEDmatch, the site 
that led police to the Golden State Killer.3 Law enforcement officers all over the 
United States are now using similar tactics in hundreds of cases to catch alleged 
killers and have logged their first jury verdict conviction in one such case in 
2019.4 While some commercial genealogy sites, like Ancestry and 23andMe, 
have a policy that requires a warrant from the police before disclosing genetic 
data, sites like GEDmatch have less stringent policies. 
But some privacy advocates believe warrantless searches of DNA 
databases could violate the Fourth Amendment and other privacy interests and 
lead to police abuses. They suggest the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision, 
Carpenter v. United States,5 provides a constitutional basis for ending these law 
enforcement tactics.6 
3  Companies such as Parabon NanoLabs now work with police and GEDmatch to load DNA 
from hundreds of cases. See Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To 
Genealogy Database, ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogy-
database/561695/. 
4  Hundreds of cases are now investigated using DNA evidence. See Heather Murphy, How 
Your DNA Could Solve a Murder, WEEK (June 27, 2018), 
https://theweek.com/articles/841864/how-dna-could-solve-murder. In June 2019, a jury convicted 
William Talbott II of two 1987 murders based on DNA evidence—the first verdict in such a case. 
See Robert Gearty, Washington Cold Case Solved Using DNA and Genetic Genealogy Results in 
Landmark Verdict, FOX NEWS (June 29, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/us/cold-case-solved-
dna-genetic-genealogy-landmark-verdict. 
5  138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018). 
 6  See Ken Strutin, DNA Without Warrant: Decoding Privacy, Probable Cause and 
Personhood, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 319, 364 (2015) (“[W]hen technology advances to 
efficiently collect and catalog shed DNA, biological tracking data, another kind of privacy interest 
might be recognized.”); see also Rebecca Lund, It Is All in the Family: Using Online DNA Profiles 
to Identify Suspects, VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. (Oct. 21, 2018), 
http://www.jetlaw.org/2018/10/21/it-is-all-in-the-family-using-online-dna-profiles-to-identify-
suspects/ (“Should police be permitted to create fake profiles and upload [DNA] data without prior 
authorization? In the wake of [Carpenter] . . . many are left wondering whether this will continue 
to be permitted.”). 
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Part II of this Article briefly examines the Carpenter decision and the 
privacy interests implicated by DNA testing and private genealogy websites. Part 
III discusses whether, after Carpenter, police searches of genealogy websites 
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Part IV explores the third-party doctrine, 
assessing its post-Carpenter viability in the DNA context. Concluding the Fourth 
Amendment provides limited protection, Part V seeks alternative solutions to the 
noted privacy concerns. 
II. CARPENTER, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND DNA TESTING
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”7 In the context of DNA testing, the term “persons” includes bodily 
fluids and DNA.8 When analyzing a search issue, courts first ask whether the 
item searched by police (e.g., a DNA test in a private database) is protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.9 If so, courts then determine whether the search was 
reasonable.10 The Supreme Court’s “basic rule” is that “‘searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”11 
This Article explores the issue of warrantless police searches of private 
genealogy databases after Carpenter, focusing on whether the Fourth 
Amendment protects DNA test results—both a person’s own results and those of 
their biological relatives—and whether the “third-party doctrine”12 is viable in 
that context. If the Fourth Amendment applies, this Article assumes without 
discussion that any warrantless search would be per se unreasonable (i.e., a 
constitutional violation). 
This part of the Article briefly recounts basic Fourth Amendment 
principles: the historical property-based approach, the modern method based on 
“reasonable expectations of privacy,” and the development of the third-party 
doctrine. Next, it examines the Carpenter decision and its potential impact on 
7  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 8  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 808–09 (2016). 
9  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967). 
10  See id. 
11  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357). 
 12  The third-party doctrine essentially holds that, “when a person voluntarily gives information 
to a third party, even for a limited, specific purpose, and that third party delivers the information 
to law enforcement, the government’s acquisition of the information cannot be defined as a search.” 
Laurie Buchan Serafino, “I Know My Rights, So You Go’n Need a Warrant for That”: The Fourth 
Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party Clouds, 19 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 154, 166 (2014). 
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Fourth Amendment law. Finally, it explores privacy interests associated with 
DNA testing and the storage of test results in both government-controlled and 
private genealogy databases and websites. 
A. Historical Fourth Amendment Analysis and the Carpenter Decision
In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court found that the police 
conducted a search under the Fourth Amendment when they accessed 
third-party, historical records of a suspect’s cell-phone location.13 In its decision, 
the Court deepened privacy protections for cell-phone usage and refused to apply 
the third-party doctrine to negate those protections. It recounted the two 
“guideposts” of the Fourth Amendment: (1) securing “the privacies of life” 
against “arbitrary power,” and (2) placing “obstacles in the way of a too 
permeating police surveillance.”14 
Privacy advocates would like to conscript these guideposts into service 
to protect information on genealogy sites from the police. Seeing Carpenter as a 
“landmark ruling on how to apply the Fourth Amendment’s protections in the 
digital world,” they envision its application to genealogy databases, which 
“contain a wealth of deeply personal information about one’s ancestry and 
medical conditions.”15 They contend the current “division between privacy in 
information technology and in information biologics does not further the ends of 
justice” and they ask why the cell phone should receive more constitutional 
protections than the contents of the human body.16 
1. The Dual Track of the Fourth Amendment
The trajectory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has followed two 
tracks. Traditionally, it had been “tied to common-law trespass” and focused on 
whether the Government “obtains information by physically intruding on a 
constitutionally protected area.”17 This common-law property sentiment was best 
represented by Entick v. Carrington,18 a well-known English case in which Lord 
Camden stated that the law “holds the property of every man so sacred, that no 
man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he 
13  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
14  Id. at 2214 (citations omitted). 
 15  Matt Ford, How the Supreme Court Could Rewrite the Rules for DNA Searches, NEW
REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148170/supreme-court-rewrite-rules-
dna-searches. 
16  Strutin, supra note 6, at 366. 
 17  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (citations omitted) (discussing Fourth Amendment 
precedents). 
18  Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB). 
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is a trespasser, though he does no damage.”19 For over a century, the Court relied 
on this property-based approach when interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 
finding a search occurs when police trespass on a property interest. It followed 
this first track in earlier cases, such as Olmstead v. United States,20 and again 
very recently in Florida v. Jardines21 and United States v. Jones,22 where the 
Court emphasized the continued viability of the property-based approach today. 
Then, in the 1960s, the Supreme Court “recognized that ‘property rights 
are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.’”23 The landmark case 
of Katz v. United States24 created a second track, finding that the Fourth 
Amendment “‘protects people, not places,’ and expanded [the] conception of the 
Amendment to protect certain expectations of privacy as well.”25 Today, not all 
Justices agree the Katz test is valid,26 and some have complained that it leads to 
inconsistent and nonsensical results.27 But, as Carpenter explained, Katz held 
that “[w]hen an individual ‘seeks to preserve something as private,’ and his 
expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ 
we have held that official intrusion into that private sphere generally qualifies as 
a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause.”28 
19  Id. at 817. 
 20  277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (finding no Fourth Amendment search when government agents 
tapped phone wires on the public streets due to a lack of trespass in “the houses or offices of the 
defendants”); see also Peter C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman, A Descriptive Analysis of the 
Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 73, 
79 (2018) (discussing Olmstead). 
21  569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) (finding a Fourth Amendment search when police trespassed with 
drug-sniffing dogs on curtilage of home); see also Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 79 
(discussing Jardines). 
22  565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (finding a Fourth Amendment search when police trespassed on 
a private vehicle to place a GPS tracker); see also Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 79 
(discussing Jones). 
23  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (discussing modern Fourth Amendment cases). 
 24  389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding a Fourth Amendment search when agents placed a 
listening device on a public telephone booth due to Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
25  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 26  Id. at 2239 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing Katz “strays” far from the constitutional text 
“by focusing on the concept of ‘privacy,’” which is nowhere in the Constitution, and contending 
the Founders understood “liberty and privacy rights” “in terms of property rights”). 
27  Id. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch derided results like Florida v. Riley, 
488 U.S. 445 (1989), which says a “police helicopter hovering 400 feet above a person’s property 
invades no reasonable expectation of privacy. Try that one out on your neighbors.” Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2266. Just Gorsuch also questioned California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), which
holds that a “person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage he puts out for
collection,” and he expressed doubt “that most people spotting a neighbor rummaging through their
garbage would think they lacked reasonable grounds to confront the rummager.” Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2266.
28  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (majority opinion). 
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The new Katz analysis grew over time, but not without difficulties. This 
led the Supreme Court to develop the third-party doctrine in United States v. 
Miller29 and Smith v. Maryland30 to explain why a Fourth Amendment search 
under Katz does not occur when a suspect entrusts private information to a third 
party, who then betrays the suspect to the police.31 With its origin in cases 
involving confidential informants, the doctrine espouses the general rule that “if 
information is possessed or known by third parties, then, for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the information.”32 
As the new millennium dawned, the Supreme Court began to recognize 
that quickly evolving advances in technology might require a sea change in its 
dual-track Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In 2001, Justice Antonin Scalia 
charted an initial course to deal with emerging technologies in Kyllo v. United 
States.33 As the Carpenter Court explained, Kyllo rejected a “mechanical 
interpretation” of the Fourth Amendment in holding that a thermal imager could 
not be used by police to detect heat radiating from a suspect’s home.34 “Because 
any other conclusion would leave homeowners ‘at the mercy of advancing 
technology,’ [the Court] determined that the Government—absent a warrant—
could not capitalize on such new sense-enhancing technology to explore what 
was happening within the home.”35 
A decade later, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued in Jones that the digital 
age made it necessary to revisit “the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” 
because “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third 
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”36 She contended the Fourth 
Amendment should not “treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”37 
Two years later, in Riley v. California,38 Chief Justice John Roberts 
delivered the first of two blockbuster cell-phone decisions. Recognizing the 
29  425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
30  442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 31  See id. (finding no Fourth Amendment search when police used a pen register because Smith 
assumed the risk when he conveyed dialed numbers to the third-party phone company); Miller, 
425 U.S. at 443 (establishing the “third-party doctrine” and finding no Fourth Amendment search 
when police subpoenaed Miller’s banks records, including months of canceled checks). 
32  Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 111. 
 33  533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (finding a Fourth Amendment search where police used a thermal 
imaging device to intrude on the private areas of a home). 
34  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214. 
35  Id. 
36  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
37  Id. at 418. 
 38  573 U.S. 373 (2014) (finding a Fourth Amendment search when police automatically 
conducted a search of the contents of an arrestee’s cell phone). 
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“immense storage” of sensitive information on cell phones, the Riley Court 
unanimously ruled that law enforcement must obtain a Fourth Amendment 
warrant to obtain a cell phone’s contents as part of a search incident to a lawful 
arrest.39 Then, four years later, Chief Justice Roberts gave an even more decisive, 
though more controversial, ruling on the matter of cell-phone privacy in 
Carpenter. 
2. The Carpenter Decision and Its Potential Impact on Police Action
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by the Court’s four “liberal” 
members) expanded privacy rights and held that law enforcement conducts a 
search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell-site location 
information (“CSLI”), which provides a “comprehensive chronicle of the user’s 
past movements.”40 Significantly, the Court re-interpreted its traditional 
understanding of a person’s privacy in their physical movements in light of 
advances in technology. 
Timothy Carpenter and his accomplices (along with their cell phones) 
robbed nine retail stores in Michigan and Ohio over a four-month period.41 Using 
court orders under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”)42—which does not 
require probable cause under the Fourth Amendment—the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) obtained business records from two wireless commercial 
carriers, disclosing CSLI for Carpenter’s phone.43 Using this data (over 12,000 
cell location points), the FBI retraced Carpenter’s movements over those four 
months, corroborating other evidence and placing him near the scenes of the 
charged robberies.44 
In holding the FBI conducted a Fourth Amendment search, the Court 
observed that the collection of third-party CSLI data intersected two lines of 
cases: (1) that stemming from United States v. Knotts45 and United States v. 
39  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (citations omitted) (discussing Riley). 
 40  Cell-site location information (“CSLI”) is continuously gathered as a cell phone 
automatically connects to a cell-site radio antenna and “generates a time-stamped record.” Id. at 
2211. 
41  Id. at 2212. 
 42  The SCA requires only that police provide a court with “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought “are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (West 2019). 
43  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
 44  Id. at 2212–13. Interestingly, Carpenter based its ruling on the “more sophisticated 
systems . . . already in use or in development” in 2018, rather than limiting its view to the 
technological facts of the case in 2011. Id. at 2218–19 (citations omitted). 
45  460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). Carpenter explained that Knotts approved police use of a beeper 
planted in a container (prior to purchase by Knotts) that “augmented” police visual surveillance 
(by ground and air) “to aid in tracking a vehicle through traffic” from Minneapolis “to Knotts’s 
cabin in Wisconsin, relying on the beeper’s signal to help keep the vehicle in view.” Carpenter, 
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Jones,46 which address “a person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location 
and movements,” and (2) that stemming from the third-party doctrine created in 
United States v. Miller47 and Smith v. Maryland.48 The Court concluded the 
warrantless police request for Carpenter’s CSLI violated his “reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”49 
Chief Justice Roberts explained that CSLI allows for “near perfect 
surveillance” (like an “ankle monitor”) and that cell phones track their owners’ 
movements “nearly exactly” because people “compulsively carry cell phones 
with them all the time . . . into private residences, doctor’s offices, political 
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”50 Further, the 
“retrospective quality” of CSLI allows police to “travel back in time” for five 
years (the current data-retention policy of wireless carriers) and analyze data 
about a person who was not previously a suspect, retracing his whereabouts 
“every moment of every day.”51 For reasons discussed later, the Court also found 
the third-party doctrine should not be extended to this new technological area.52 
The Carpenter Court’s willingness to expand modern privacy rights 
while limiting the third-party doctrine has far-reaching implications. It is fair to 
consider whether the Court would take a similar approach in requiring the police 
to obtain a Fourth Amendment warrant before accessing DNA data on genealogy 
138 S. Ct. at 2215. This was not a Fourth Amendment search “because ‘[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements 
from one place to another,’” and “the movements of the vehicle and its final destination had been 
‘voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.’” Id. (citations omitted). The Court noted 
that Knotts had “reserved the question whether ‘different constitutional principles may be 
applicable’ if ‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country [were] possible.’” Id. at 
2215 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284). 
46  565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). Carpenter explained that Jones invalidated a search by FBI 
agents who “installed a GPS tracking device on Jones’s vehicle and remotely monitored the 
vehicle’s movements for 28 days” because the police had physically trespassed on the vehicle to 
place the tracker. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215. Five Justices had also “agreed that related privacy 
concerns would be raised by, for example, ‘surreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection 
system’ in Jones’s car to track Jones himself, or conducting GPS tracking of his cell phone” 
because this type of monitoring “tracks ‘every movement’ a person makes” and “that ‘longer term 
GPS monitoring . . . impinges on expectations of privacy’—regardless whether those movements 
were disclosed to the public at large.” Id. at 2215 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415, 426, 428 
(concurring opinions of Alito & Sotomayor, JJ., respectively)). 
47  425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 48  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215–16 (explaining United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) 
(no search of third-party bank records) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no search of 
third-party phone numbers)). 
49  Id. at 2219. 
50  Id. at 2218. 
51  Id. 
 52  The Carpenter Court’s analysis of the third-party doctrine will be discussed below. See infra 
Part IV. 
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web sites.53 Taking into account the two “guideposts” of the Fourth Amendment, 
one could argue the Constitution should secure “the privacies of life” contained 
in one’s DNA from arbitrary police searches and place “obstacles” in the way of 
these searches that could permeate too far into an individual’s heritage and health 
data.54 Even Justice Neil Gorsuch, in dissent in Carpenter, recognized the 
concern in DNA cases: “Can the government . . . secure your DNA from 
23andMe without a warrant or probable cause? Smith and Miller say yes it can—
at least without running afoul of Katz. But that result strikes most lawyers and 
judges today—me included—as pretty unlikely.”55 
Just as Carpenter reinterpreted the idea of privacy in physical 
movements, advocates hope the Supreme Court will broaden its understanding 
of privacy interests involving DNA. And just as Carpenter was willing to limit 
the third-party doctrine as applied to cell-phone technology, they hope the Court 
will similarly limit that doctrine based on advances in DNA testing and the 
ubiquity of “voluntary” genealogy tests in modern society. As one scholar 
argues, DNA is “the ‘object’ or container in which privacy inheres, not merely 
the data or contents,” and both computers and “nuclear DNA contain more 
information than will be found in the home or ever could be. Thus, if the 
expectations of millions can define the privacy interest in cell phones, certainly 
the expectations of billions should decide the level of privacy in the human 
genome.”56 
B. Understanding Genetic Privacy and Genealogy Databases
Before applying a post-Carpenter Fourth Amendment analysis to DNA 
testing and genealogy websites, it is necessary to consider the biological 
processes at work and the spectrum of DNA-related privacy interests being 
claimed. This section provides basic information about DNA testing and 
proposes a model to form a common frame of reference when discussing the 
level of privacy associated with DNA test results. 
1. The Promise of DNA and Its Analysis
As living organisms, human beings possess a complete set of genetic 
material—a genome—that dictates how they will grow, develop, and reproduce. 
Within the nucleus of each of the trillions of cells within human beings is a 
molecule of genetic material known as DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid. It is 
inherited equally from a person’s mother and father, carries critical genetic 
information, and is packaged in “divided bunches” on 23 paired, “thread-like 
53  See Ford, supra note 15. 
54  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
55  Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
56  Strutin, supra note 6, at 363. 
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structures called chromosomes.”57 These paired chromosomes (one from mom 
and one from dad) contain two copies of each “gene,” which is a segment of 
DNA containing “coding sequences that determine what the gene does (e.g., 
trigger premature gray hair), and non-coding sequences that determine when the 
gene is expressed (e.g., at age 20).”58 Variants of each gene, known as “alleles,” 
“occupy fixed positions (called a locus for one, loci for two or more) on a specific 
chromosome.”59 The allele holds the key to DNA identification analysis. 
During the last century, as scientists worked to “sequence” the human 
genome, they discovered that the “vast majority of DNA—over 99.7 percent—
is identical between two people.”60 But allele variations along the DNA strand, 
especially on 13 specific loci, allow scientists to “obtain [26] discrete 
measurements that help individuate one person from another.”61 These loci, in 
regions of DNA with no known coding function—“junk DNA”62—are now at 
the core of forensic DNA analysis. 
Forensic DNA analysis “identifies the alleles at each of the 13 loci, 
determines the frequency with which the combination at a single locus occurs 
across the population, and then calculates a ‘random-match probability,’” which 
is defined as “the probability that a person other than the suspect, randomly 
selected from the population, will have this profile.”63 Allele analysis not only 
helps identify specific individuals, but also a person’s biological relatives. 
“Because these [26] alleles are directly inherited from one’s biological parents, 
there is a significant probability that two people who share biological ties will 
also share a large number of alleles in common.”64 
The “advent of DNA technology” and forensic DNA testing based on 
allele analysis has been hailed by the Supreme Court as one of the “most 
significant scientific advancements of our era.”65 The Court has acknowledged 
the “undisputed utility” of DNA testing in the criminal justice system, noting its 
“unparalleled ability” to exonerate the wrongly convicted and “identify the 
guilty. It has the potential to significantly improve both the criminal justice 
57  Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
291, 294–95 (2010); Genetics Home Reference, What Is a Chromosome?, NAT’L INST. HEALTH 
(Aug. 20, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/chromosome. 
58  Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on 
Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 7–8 (2010). 
59  Id. at 8. 
60  Murphy, supra note 57, at 294–95. 
61  Id. 
 62  Gabel, supra note 58, at 8–9; see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 445 (2013) 
(discussing “junk DNA”). 
63  Epstein, supra note 2, at 143–44. 
64  Murphy, supra note 57, at 295. 
65  King, 569 U.S. at 442. 
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system and police investigative practices.”66 And its uses go beyond criminal 
justice. More recently, this same impetus has driven a lucrative private, 
commercial genealogy market for individuals seeking to learn more about their 
own heritage and to connect with biological relatives around the world.67 
2. CODIS, NDIS, and Government-Run DNA Databases
A key part of the success of forensic DNA testing has been the 
development of a government-run database used to identify perpetrators of 
serious criminal acts. That effort began in earnest in 1990 with the creation of 
the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”)—software developed by the FBI 
to help navigate DNA databases at state and local crime labs.68 In 1994, Congress 
sanctioned CODIS with the DNA Identification Act, which also authorized the 
FBI to create a National DNA Index System (“NDIS”), a national database that 
also links with state and local crime labs.69 CODIS helps law enforcement test 
unknown DNA samples gathered from crime scenes against DNA results 
gathered from known criminals.70 As Justice Scalia explained, “[T]he CODIS 
system works by checking to see whether any of the [DNA] samples in the 
Unsolved Crimes Collection match any of the samples in the Convict and 
Arrestee Collection.”71 
CODIS has become “one of the largest genetic surveillance tools in the 
world,” with “DNA profiles from over 14.3 million known individuals and from 
over 625,000 crime scene samples,” and “has survived every legal challenge.”72 
The number of samples collected has grown in the wake of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2013 decision approving state laws that allow for the collection of DNA 
from certain arrestees.73 Now, over half of the states allow for DNA 
“test-on-arrest” with “varying standards and procedures in terms of qualifying 
66  Id. 
67  See infra Section II.B.3. 
 68  Gabel, supra note 58, at 13–14; see also Thomas Hale-Kupiec, Immortal Invasive 
Initiatives? The Need for a Genetic “Right to be Forgotten”, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 441 (2016) 
(discussing the history of CODIS). 
69  Gabel, supra note 58, at 14. 
 70  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “CODIS sets uniform national standards for DNA 
matching and then facilitates connections between local law enforcement agencies who can share 
more specific information about matched STR profiles.” King, 569 U.S. at 445. The Court 
expressed its understanding that “the information in the database is only useful for human identity 
testing” and that DNA “information is recorded only as a ‘string of numbers.’” Id. 
71  Id. at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 72  Jason Kreag, Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. REV. 
1491, 1494 (2015). 
73  See King, 569 U.S. at 465–66. That decision will be discussed below in Part III; see also 
Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
541, 551 (2016) (“DNA collection is now an accepted part of being arrested.”). 
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offenses, timing for taking a sample, conditions for destroying samples, and their 
use in court proceedings.”74 This growing database not only makes it easier to 
find exact matches, but it also assists with “familial searching” for a relative of a 
criminal perpetrator.75 Studies have shown that, if “the search threshold is set 
widely enough, it is 80 to 90 percent likely that a partial match search will include 
the relative in its results.”76 
CODIS is governed by strict standards and does not formally interface 
with databases that record criminal histories.77 Thus, some law enforcement 
agencies continue to create local DNA databases that provide more search 
flexibility with less regulation.78 These local databases often contain more 
private information than found in CODIS and are sometimes funded by for-profit 
enterprises.79 
3. Private DNA Databases and Genealogy Websites
While CODIS and NDIS fought off legal attacks and became more 
efficient means for police to locate perpetrators, the private sector 
commercialized DNA testing to cater to the booming genealogy industry. The 
availability of cheap, easy, online genealogy websites fed the natural human 
desire to get in touch with one’s roots. With genealogy becoming “the second 
most popular hobby in the U.S. after gardening,” websites dealing with 
genealogy became “the second most visited category of websites, after 
pornography.80 It’s a billion-dollar industry that has spawned profitable websites, 
television shows, scores of books and—with the advent of over-the-counter 
genetic test kits—a cottage industry in DNA ancestry testing.”81 
The most popular of these commercial genealogy DNA services are 
23andMe and Ancestry. Already, those two companies alone have tested and 
databased well over ten million DNA samples, with the number of customers 
more than doubling in 2017.82 Because these genealogy-related DNA services 
74  Strutin, supra note 6, at 346. 
75  Murphy, supra note 57, at 297–98. 
76  Id. at 298. 
77  See Hale-Kupiec, supra note 68, at 470–71. 
78  Kreag, supra note 72, at 1494 n.14. 
 79  Id. at 1497 (explaining local databases “often include genetic profiles” and are easier to 
access because “local agencies are free to search these databases . . . unconstrained by” federal 
limits); see also Logan & Ferguson, supra note 73, at 551. 
80  Gregory Rodriguez, How Genealogy Became Almost as Popular as Porn, TIME (May 30, 
2014), https://time.com/133811/how-genealogy-became-almost-as-popular-as-porn/. 
81  Id. 
 82  Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumer-dna-
testing-blew-up. 
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seek to reveal much more than mere identification, they work differently than 
CODIS. Ancestry explains that its “autosomal DNA test” is different than the 
Y-chromosome or mitochondrial DNA tests because it surveys “a person’s entire 
genome at over 700,000 locations. It covers both the maternal and paternal sides 
of the family tree, so it covers all lineages.”83 And with customers wanting ever 
more information about their backgrounds and their bodies, the success of these 
genealogy projects has spawned spin-off companies, such as Habit and 
Promethease, which take the DNA files prepared by 23andMe and Ancestry and 
“provide a breakdown of people’s diet or health risks, frequently with little 
oversight from regulators.”84 
One such spinoff service is GEDmatch, the website successfully used by 
law enforcement officers in the Golden State Killer case (and many other cases 
since).85 GEDmatch allows users (at no cost) to upload their DNA test results 
(such as from Ancestry and 23andMe) to a centralized website.86 From there, 
GEDmatch converts the original data “to a form that makes it more efficient for 
the software to perform searches and comparisons” and loads it into a relational 
database in a “compressed binary format” called “tokenization.”87 By using 
services such as GEDmatch, users can maximize their chances of finding new 
biological relatives by comparing their DNA results across a broader spectrum 
than the individual databases maintained separately by each commercial service. 
The massive expansion of the genealogy industry has led to the curious 
situation where millions of average, law-abiding persons have voluntarily given 
their DNA to corporations (for a fee) to test and store in massive databases. And 
this practice has blossomed even while a privacy battle has been waging in the 
courts over government efforts through CODIS and NDIS to take DNA samples 
from those convicted and accused of crimes for the primary purpose of 
identification. Thus, it was only a matter of time before savvy law enforcement 
officers recognized the potential in these private DNA databases, filled with new 
and diverse samples, to locate criminal perpetrators (or their biological families) 
who had evaded discovery because their DNA samples had never been loaded 
into government-controlled databases. 
83  AncestryDNA - Frequently Asked Questions, ANCESTRY, 
https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/us/faq#about-3 (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
84  Regalado, supra note 82. 
 85  See Avi Selk, The Ingenious and ‘Dystopian’ DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt the 
‘Golden State Killer’ Suspect, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2018/04/27/golden-state-killer-dna-
website-gedmatch-was-used-to-identify-joseph-deangelo-as-suspect-police-say/?noredirect=on. 
86  GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH (May 18, 2019), 
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm. 
87  Id. 
2019] 23 AND PLEA 67 
4. Charting Privacy Association Levels (PALs)
Before analyzing DNA privacy issues through the lens of the Fourth 
Amendment, it is helpful to have a common frame of reference. The chart below 
outlines what might be called “privacy association levels” (“PALs”), which are 
intended only in a descriptive and referential way. No doubt, there are other ways 
to conceptualize the spectrum of involved privacy interests, and some may 
disagree about the order of placement of these items on the spectrum. But the 
chart is intended merely to provide a common reference point for discussion for 
the remainder of this Article. 
As the chart suggests, the privacy area of closest association to the 
subject of a criminal investigation is when the DNA is still present in the 
subject’s body. The PAL chart moves progressively away from this closest 
privacy association when the subject voluntarily provides DNA test results to 
third parties, the public at large, and, finally, the police. The chart next moves to 
the privacy interest (if any) that criminal subjects have in the DNA of biological 
relatives, following a similar attenuation when those relatives provide their DNA 
results to third parties, the public at large, and, finally, the police. The discussions 
throughout this Article will reference these various scenarios by their PAL level 
(e.g., a Level 2 search of a criminal subject’s DNA test results while still in the 
owner’s personal possession). 
III. APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO DNA TESTS AFTER CARPENTER
Part III of this Article examines whether the Fourth Amendment applies 
to police searches of DNA databases and private genealogy sites. It approaches 
the problem from the perspective of individual subjects of criminal investigation, 
first applying the modern analysis begun in Katz and asking whether criminal 
subjects possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own DNA and in 
the DNA of their biological relatives. The discussion next considers those same 
questions under the traditional property-based approach to the Fourth 
Amendment, which has made a comeback in recent years. This Article separately 
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addresses the third-party doctrine in Part IV. While third-party considerations 
could be examined as part of a Katz analysis, the discussion is clearer if analyzed 
separately, as the Court did in Carpenter. 
A. Analyzing Genetic Privacy Under the Katz Approach
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis created in Katz has 
become the lodestar of Fourth Amendment case law, even though the Supreme 
Court has recently labored to restore the traditional property-rights analysis to its 
rightful place in Fourth Amendment thinking. As Justice Clarence Thomas has 
explained, the Supreme Court developed this modern analysis by adopting the 
methodology proposed by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his concurring 
opinion in Katz, in which he “identified a ‘twofold requirement’ to determine 
when the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply: ‘first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”’”88 Over 
time, the Supreme Court has “minimized” its inquiry into subjective intent, 
leaving only the “objective prong—the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test 
that the Court still applies today.”89 
Referencing the various PALs in the chart at the end of Part II, this 
section focuses on whether, under a Katz analysis, subjects of criminal 
investigations have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own DNA and 
test results and in the DNA tests of their biological relatives. 
1. Privacy at the Point of DNA Collection: Levels 1 and 2
As the descriptive PAL chart suggests above, the closest privacy 
association for DNA testing is while the DNA is still within the criminal subject’s 
body, prior to collection by the police—a Level 1 association. Here, the Supreme 
Court and legal scholars agree the Fourth Amendment protects bodily fluids (and 
other biological items) while still attached to the criminal subject.90 The Court 
has made this point explicit in the DNA context, stating it “can be agreed that 
using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain 
DNA samples is a search. Virtually any ‘intrusio[n] into the human body,’ will 
88  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2237 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
89  Id. at 2238. 
 90  As Professor Andrew Ferguson has noted, the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “persons” 
has been interpreted by the courts to include “intrusions into the human body to draw blood or 
obtain saliva,” as well as to “excretions from the human body, such as urine and breath in a 
breathalyzer.” Ferguson, supra note 8, at 854–55. “DNA recovered from a person was obviously 
not considered by the Founders, but has been granted limited protection by the courts.” Id. at 855. 
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work an invasion of ‘cherished personal security’ that is subject to constitutional 
scrutiny.”91 
Similarly, PAL Level 2 is primarily a theoretical construct that envisions 
the situation where a criminal subject has not turned over DNA (or results of a 
DNA test) to a third party, but where the DNA has left the subject’s body. In this 
straightforward scenario, the DNA or test results should be treated as an “effect” 
of the subject, much like a wedding ring or wallet in one’s pocket, and the police 
should be held to the same Fourth Amendment standards as any physical object 
in a person’s possession, typically considered within a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.92 
While it is undisputed that criminal subjects have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their bodies and items within their possession, two 
topics merit a pause for further consideration: (1) automatic DNA collection from 
arrestees, and (2) DNA that is “abandoned” by criminal subjects. 
First, in Maryland v. King,93 the Supreme Court approved Maryland’s 
practice of automatically collecting DNA samples from certain arrestees.94 It had 
already been assumed as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement that “the state does not need probable cause to compel DNA samples 
from convicted offenders [who] are deemed to have a reduced expectation of 
privacy in their genetic information.”95 In King, the Court went further, allowing 
police to collect DNA samples from certain arrestees during the booking process 
(and submitting that DNA to CODIS) as a means of “identifying” them—a 
theory derided by Justice Scalia in dissent.96 Therefore, as long as the police 
possess a (theoretical) interest in identifying certain arrestees, the Supreme Court 
apparently will allow them to run DNA tests on samples collected without 
probable cause as an automatic part of the booking process. 
Second, DNA that has been “abandoned” by criminal suspects by exiting 
their bodies—for instance, by spitting on the sidewalk, scratching skin cells from 
91  Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013) (citations omitted) (providing examples to 
include drawing blood, “scraping an arrestee’s fingernails to obtain trace evidence,” and 
breathalyzer tests). 
92  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (holding that the seizure of a lump 
of cocaine found in a suspect’s pocket that was not immediately recognized as contraband by the 
officer is unconstitutional). 
93  569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
94  See generally id. 
 95  Gabel, supra note 58, at 33 (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 
2004)). 
96  In dissent, Justice Scalia contended Maryland did not use the arrestee’s DNA for 
identification but for the purpose of solving unsolved crimes. King, 569 U.S. at 473 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (explaining the “logical” thing for Maryland to do if identification were its aim would 
be to compare the arrestee’s DNA against CODIS’s “Convict and Arrestee Collection” known 
database; however, Maryland was actually comparing the arrestee’s samples against CODIS’s 
“Unsolved Crimes Collection” unknown database). 
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their arms, or naturally shedding a strand of hair—is seemingly available for 
police collection without a Fourth Amendment warrant.97 This is apparently so 
even though, “[l]ike little else, DNA is exposed to the public and abandoned 
every time we move.”98 Although the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively 
on this subject, and some scholars argue against treating such DNA as 
abandoned,99 the matter has been deemed largely a non-issue by lower courts that 
have addressed it.100 For instance, in Raynor v. State,101 police took swabs of 
DNA from where the defendant had been “rubbing his bare arms against the 
armrests of the chair in which he had been seated.”102 During his unsuccessful 
challenge to the police’s testing of that DNA, Raynor abandoned as fruitless any 
argument that the collection of his DNA from the armchair was unlawful.103 
2. Privacy in the “Whole of a Person’s Genetic Makeup”:
Levels 3, 4, and 5
The next three levels on the PAL chart involve criminal subjects who 
give DNA or test results to a third party—a company like 23andMe (Level 3) or 
a public website like GEDmatch (Level 4)—or to the police (Level 5). This 
Article will not discuss the Level 5 scenario because it assumes a criminal subject 
has made a knowing, voluntary waiver of any privacy rights after informed 
consent. Further, third-party ramifications of the searches at Levels 3 and 4 will 
be discussed in detail in Part IV in the context of the third-party doctrine, where 
they are most relevant. Instead, this section will focus entirely on whether, in 
light of the analysis in Carpenter, the Fourth Amendment should recognize a 
freestanding privacy interest in the “whole of a person’s genetic makeup.” 
97  See Epstein, supra note 2, at 151–52. 
98  Id. at 151. 
 99  See generally Albert E. Scherr, Genetic Privacy & the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated 
Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 GA. L. REV. 445 (2013) (arguing against current case law that 
the Fourth Amendment should recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in some “abandoned” 
DNA). 
100  See id. at 447 n.1 (citing Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 351–52 (Mass. 2007)). 
See also State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006); 
State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007). 
101  99 A.3d 753 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, Raynor v. Maryland, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015). 
102  Id. at 754. 
103  Id. at 754–55. 
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3. Pre-Carpenter Considerations
Carpenter found a privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment in the 
“whole of a person’s physical movements.”104 In recognizing that interest, the 
Court noted two guideposts from the Amendment: (1) securing “the privacies of 
life” against “arbitrary power,” and (2) placing “obstacles in the way of a too 
permeating police surveillance.”105 Similarly, some argue an interest should be 
recognized in the content of one’s DNA.106 They see DNA as even more 
sui generis than cell phones and argue it should qualify for special protection 
because it contains “data that dwarfs the memory sticks of the average cell 
phone,” is the “modern equivalent of the Domesday Book, an unalterable final 
survey of everything human,” and is “even more revealing (present and future)” 
than the technology in Riley and Carpenter.107 Moreover, Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston108 provides support for a reasonable expectation of privacy in the test 
results of one’s biological fluids (in that case, urine).109 Essentially, supporters 
of a DNA privacy right argue for recognizing a privacy interest in the “whole of 
a person’s genetic makeup.” 
Maryland rejected a similar argument in Raynor v. State, where police 
tested Raynor’s “abandoned” DNA left on the armrest of an interview chair.110 
The court found that, while the “non-coding” DNA areas (i.e., “junk” DNA) are 
useful to identify a person, they do not give access to “intimate [genetic] 
information,” and police have “no incentive” to go beyond identification.111 And 
even if they did, Raynor did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of his DNA (or at least the portion tested for identification).112 This 
104  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (drawing the phrase from opinions 
in Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 415, 430 (2012) (concurring opinions of Alito and 
Sotomayor, JJ., respectively)). 
105  Id. at 2213–14. 
 106  Strutin, supra note 6, at 366 (wondering after Riley why the cell phone should receive more 
constitutional protections than the contents of the human body). 
107  Id. at 361. 
108  532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 109  Id. at 80–86 (finding a violation when a state hospital adopted a policy to screen the urine 
of pregnant women for cocaine and refer them to police if they tested positive). 
110  Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 755 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, Raynor v. Maryland, 135 S. Ct. 
1509 (2015); see also Hana Gandi, Why No Backlash?: Advances in Forensic Technology and the 
Criminalized Fourth Amendment, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 533, 552 (2015) (criticizing Raynor). 
111  Raynor, 99 A.3d at 762. 
112  Id. at 765. 
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reasoning tracked the Supreme Court’s discussion in King.113 The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals also rejected a related argument in 2006.114 
But both those cases were decided prior to Carpenter, both involved 
searches of CODIS, and neither involved a search into the more intimate data 
contained on private DNA databases.115 In contrast, the Golden State Killer 
investigation searched for a genetic mutation.116 Thus, a better argument can be 
made after Carpenter, especially if the searched DNA test results go beyond 
mere suspect identification. 
Indeed, Carpenter provides new lines of argument. In recognizing a 
privacy interest in “the whole of a person’s physical movements,”117 the Court 
balanced five factors—“intimacy, comprehensiveness, expense, retrospectivity, 
and voluntariness”118—that apply in the context of DNA testing. This balancing 
was rightly criticized by the dissenters119 but could be applied here as one of the 
alterations Carpenter made to Fourth Amendment law. This Article will apply 
the factors below, taking them at face value without questioning the wisdom of 
the Court in developing this multifactor test. 
B. Applying Carpenter’s Five Factors
The first factor (Intimacy) recognizes that an activity is more likely to 
be protected by the Fourth Amendment if it provides an “intimate window into a 
person’s life, revealing . . . ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations,’”120 as well as a view into “private residences, doctor’s offices, . . . 
and other potentially revealing locales.”121 Cell-site location information 
(“CSLI”) met that criteria, and so might DNA results. Professor Sonia Suter 
explains that DNA invokes the intimate notion of “personhood”—it is “unique 
113  Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464 (2013) (reasoning that “CODIS loci come from 
noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee” and are not tested 
for that purpose). 
114  See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that 
police may not store a person’s “genetic fingerprint” in CODIS and “re-search” it and concluding 
that accessing CODIS records is not a search because it matches “one piece of personal information 
against government records”). 
115  See generally id.; Raynor, 99 A.3d 753. 
116  Oreskes et al., supra note 1. 
117  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018). 
118  Justice Kennedy assigned these labels in dissent. Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 119  Id. at 2234 (criticizing the Majority’s “newly conceived” “multifactor analysis” as an 
“unstable foundation”); see also id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the new 
balancing test keeps Smith and Miller “on life support” while supplementing them with a 
“multilayered inquiry” that seems like “Katz-squared”). 
120  Id. at 2217 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
121  Id. at 2218. 
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to each of us and therefore personal in the sense that it identifies us.”122 It too 
provides an intimate window into our lives: it “has a familial component, 
revealing links with relatives”; it “makes us vulnerable to undesirable exposure 
because it reveals intimate aspects of ourselves”; it can “stigmatize us” due to 
our “genetic flaws”; and it “makes us vulnerable to discrimination by insurers, 
employers, [and] future spouses.”123 Thus, although DNA does not reveal a 
person’s movements, it does reveal the intimate (biological) essence of a 
person’s nature. 
The second factor (Comprehensiveness) recognizes that society’s 
expectations about the comprehensiveness of law enforcement’s capabilities can 
influence whether an expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable. For 
instance, society had an expectation “that law enforcement agents and others 
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and 
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long 
period.”124 With DNA, until the end of the last century, no one in society would 
have expected the decoding of the human genome and the ability of law 
enforcement to swab a cheek and comprehensively unlock the mysteries of a 
person’s genetic makeup. That ability would have been in the realm of science 
fiction until recently. This factor also weighs in favor of recognizing a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in one’s genetic makeup. 
The third factor (Expense) recognizes that the greater the ease and 
inexpense with which the police can access private data “compared to traditional 
investigative tools,” the greater the weight in favor of privacy rights.125 As with 
the collection of CSLI, the efficiency of genetic testing (as demonstrated by the 
Golden State Killer case) makes it cheap and easy for law enforcement to upload 
a DNA sample on a free website (e.g., GEDmatch) and obtain previously 
unknowable leads to uncover a serial killer from decades ago.126 Traditional 
investigative tools were woefully inept at finding the Golden State Killer, yet 
DNA tracking uncovered him with stunning alacrity. This factor also aligns in 
favor of recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The fourth factor (Retrospectivity) recognizes that a government 
intrusion with a “retrospective quality” that allows the police to learn past 
information about a criminal subject even before coming under investigation 
weighs in favor of privacy rights.127 As Carpenter found with CSLI, DNA testing 
provides police an even more retrospective look into a criminal subject’s past. 
122  Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of 
Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 773 (2004). 
123  Id. at 739. 
124  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 430). 
125  Id. at 2217–18. 
 126  Epstein, supra note 2, at 151–52 (“For DNA testing, the technology is not in the hands of 
private individuals but is easily obtained, at modest cost, from labs nationwide.”). 
127  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
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While DNA does not reveal the past movements of individuals, it does reveal the 
migrations of their ancestors, the true identity and biological history of their 
families, their genetic mutations, and their predisposition for future disease. In 
the process of searching for suspects using DNA databases, all this data can be 
uncovered on a person who is not even under the gaze of suspicion for any 
offense. This too weighs in favor of privacy. 
The fifth factor (Voluntariness) recognizes that activities that are less 
voluntary—either because of societal factors (e.g., those who “compulsively 
carry cell phones with them all the time”) or because of the nature of technology 
(e.g., “a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any 
affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up”)—are more likely to 
be considered private.128 In the context of genetic testing, DNA is shed by 
everyone all day long wherever they go, and the advances in technology make it 
ever more feasible to test that DNA. Also, DNA is often taken involuntarily (i.e., 
through arrest or conviction sampling requirements). Moreover, Carpenter 
clarified that the Fourth Amendment is not “surrendered” merely because a 
person ventures into the public sphere or because a private activity is “generated 
for commercial purposes.”129 Thus, the criminal subjects in Levels 3 and 4 of the 
PAL chart from Part II should not lose the ability to claim a protected privacy 
interest merely because they generated DNA results as part of commercial 
genealogy services or because they expected and welcomed some interaction in 
the public sphere. 
Finally, Carpenter clarified that, when evaluating the issue, courts may 
consider the “continued increase in technology,” including the “more 
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”130 The 
Carpenter Court looked beyond the facts of the case from 2011 and ruled based 
on 2018 technology and beyond. One can only imagine what the future might 
hold for DNA research. Even “junk DNA” may one day have the potential to 
reveal intimate details about a person. Acting now to protect DNA under the 
Fourth Amendment makes as much sense as protecting the CSLI in Carpenter. 
In sum, the Supreme Court in King (and several lower courts) did not 
seem amenable to recognizing a substantive privacy interest in a person’s own 
genetic makeup. But those cases were limited to situations involving a CODIS 
search of “junk DNA” for mere identification purposes, with the government’s 
assurance it was not interested in searching for any other type of genetic data. 
The private genealogy database question addressed in this Article raises the exact 
situations the Supreme Court was avoiding in King (and for which Justice Scalia 
derided the Majority). And after Carpenter—at least in a search of the criminal 
suspect’s own DNA results generated by private companies—the five balancing 
128  Id. at 2218, 2220 (emphasis added). 
129  Id. at 2217. 
130  Id. at 2218–19. 
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factors are more likely to weigh in favor of recognizing a privacy interest under 
the Fourth Amendment in the “whole of a person’s genetic makeup.” 
1. Privacy in the DNA of a Biological Relative? Levels 6, 7, 8, and 9
In the prior two sections, this Article has contended that, under a Katz 
Fourth Amendment analysis (in light of Carpenter and advancing technology), 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their 
DNA, whether it is in their body, in their personal possession, or even out of their 
possession (subject to the third-party doctrine, to be discussed in Part IV). 
But perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this issue is the way law 
enforcement has located suspects by searching private genealogy databases for 
the suspects’ biological relatives (i.e., “familial searching”).131 That is the 
situation with Levels 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the PAL chart—it is the biological relatives 
of the criminal subject whose own DNA or test results are either within their 
possession (Level 6) or given to a third party (Level 7), a public website (Level 
8), or the police (Level 9). These four levels will be analyzed together below for 
reasons that will become apparent. 
In the usual scenario, law enforcement—armed with an unknown DNA 
sample—searches a private genealogy DNA database and discovers a DNA test 
result that matches a biological relative of the unknown sample’s owner.132 The 
police then use that DNA information to narrow down the list of potential 
suspects, eventually discovering the identity of the actual perpetrator through the 
use of other investigative means and techniques.133 In this process, what privacy 
interests are implicated? As one commentator noted, this creates a “fourth-party 
problem of sorts” because it raises the question of whether a criminal suspect has 
any legal interest in a family member’s DNA that has been uploaded to a 
commercial DNA database.134 
Adding yet another wrinkle, it may be impossible for the police to 
prevent the actual suspect’s DNA from exposure during one of these “biological 
relative” database searches.135 A broad search of a database for the relative of a 
suspect might very well reveal the suspect’s own DNA data because in these 
familial searches “the word ‘relative’ can refer to ‘the person in the database, any 
131  Murphy, supra note 57, at 297–98 (explaining “when a database search does not turn up an 
exact match, it is possible to follow up with a moderate- or low-stringency search that returns 
partial matches—profiles that match some, but not all, of the sample’s alleles”—usually up to 25 
persons). 
132  See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
133  See, e.g., id. 
134  Ford, supra note 15. 
135  See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 57, at 298. 
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of that person’s kin (suspected sources of the material), as well as the actual 
source of the material.’”136 
To simplify the analysis, this Article will assume the police can search a 
genealogy database and find a relative without uncovering the DNA results of 
the actual suspect. Given that caveat, does a suspect have a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in the DNA of a distant relative (or a close relative, for 
that matter)? Put another way, does the suspect have a personal privacy interest 
in the genetic material coming from a relative’s body? The answer to that 
question is “no.”137 
The primary problem is “standing”—a doctrine that “focuses on whether 
the person seeking to challenge the legality of a search as a basis for suppressing 
evidence was himself the ‘victim’ of the search or seizure.”138 “The Supreme 
Court’s expectation of privacy cases deny standing to other family members, as 
Fourth Amendment rights are deemed ‘personal.’”139 The Court has held that 
personal rights “may not be vicariously asserted,” and therefore a person who 
had damaging evidence found “by a search of a third person’s premises or 
property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”140 Here, 
criminal subjects who seek to apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence 
obtained through the search of DNA samples of biological relatives are 
attempting to vicariously assert the rights of their third-party relatives. The 
subjects are not the victims. The only ones who could raise an objection would 
be the biological family members themselves. 
A way of addressing the standing problem here is to simply recognize 
that a person does not—subjectively or objectively—have an expectation of 
privacy in someone else’s body. While that should end the matter, after 
Carpenter it is fair to ask whether a right to the “whole of a person’s genetic 
material” might be stretched to include “genetic material held in common with a 
relative.” If someone else’s DNA can reveal private data about criminal subjects, 
one might argue the subjects have some expectation that their portion of the DNA 
will remain private (at least from the police). 
136  Id. at 298. 
 137  See id. at 334 (“What constitutional interest does the lawfully databased person, or that 
person’s relatives, have in that search? . . . [U]nder conventional doctrine, none.”). 
138  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 (1978). 
 139  Epstein, supra note 2, at 161–62. Professor Epstein cites several articles critical of this 
doctrine, including Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Fourth Amendment Standing: A New Paradigm 
Based on Article III Rules and Right to Privacy, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 669, 681 (2006) (arguing to 
broaden the standing doctrine to include “anyone against whom the evidence is being introduced”). 
140  Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133–34. The doctrine partly stems from the Court’s desire to limit the 
use of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule only to benefit those whose rights have been 
violated. “Even if such a person is not a defendant in the action, he may be able to recover damages 
for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights or seek redress under state law for invasion of 
privacy or trespass.” Id. at 134. 
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The problem with this theory is twofold. Subjectively, it seems 
implausible most people believe they have a privacy interest in biological data 
contained in the body of a relative (who they might never have met). Even if such 
a person with that subjective belief could be found, objectively—although there 
is no objective data to support this next statement—it seems society would not 
be willing to go that far in recognizing such an asserted privacy right as 
reasonable. To ask the question is nearly to answer it because it seems so far 
removed from any current societal beliefs. It is unlike the dubious, but now-
accepted, proposition under Katz that “individuals can have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in another person’s property.”141 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s abortion precedents involving the right of 
privacy have made it clear that one person (i.e., the father) does not have an 
actionable privacy interest in the body of another person (i.e., the mother of the 
father’s child) while that child is within the mother’s womb.142 And if a father 
does not have an actionable privacy interest in that circumstance, it seems 
unlikely a relative could assert a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the 
DNA of another.143 Moreover, such an assertion would be difficult to control 
with any reasonable limiting principle, since 99.7% of genetic material is also 
shared with every other person on the planet. In light of that statistic, at what 
point would such a privacy interest cease? 
For those reasons, a Katz analysis under the circumstances in Levels 6, 
7, 8, and 9 of the PAL chart leads to the conclusion that a criminal subject has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA or test results of a biological 
relative. In sum, while criminal subjects of a police genealogy search might be 
able to assert a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their own DNA or test 
results (subject to the third-party doctrine), they have no right to assert the 
privacy interests of biological relatives, whose DNA might be exposed to police 
intrusion as part of a familial search. 
141  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2242 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[A] 
person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else.” (citing 
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). 
142  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992) (striking down a provision 
requiring woman to notify husband of abortion decision, stating “it cannot be claimed that the 
father’s interest in the fetus’ welfare is equal to the mother’s protected liberty, since it is an 
inescapable biological fact that state regulation with respect to the fetus will have a far greater 
impact on the pregnant woman’s bodily integrity than it will on the husband”); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973) (“Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton . . . do we discuss the 
father’s rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No paternal right 
has been asserted in either of the cases . . . .”). 
143  See also Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch 
Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 257–58 (2006) (arguing Due Process does not give a 
parent the right to challenge the search of a child’s DNA, even though a parent has a right to control 
a child’s upbringing and education). 
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C. Analyzing Genetic Privacy Under the Traditional Property-Rights
Approach
The Supreme Court recently has sought to restore the traditional pre-
Katz property-rights analysis under the Fourth Amendment. But would applying 
a property-based analysis in the DNA context lead to a different result than a 
Katz analysis? Referencing the various privacy levels in the PAL chart at the end 
of Part II, this section addresses that question. 
1. Restoring a Traditional Property-Based Approach to the Fourth
Amendment
In Jones, the Supreme Court signaled its desire to restore the traditional 
property-based approach to its rightful analytical place under the Fourth 
Amendment because the Court had unwittingly displaced it by the Katz 
analysis.144 Justice Scalia explained the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases had 
been tied to common-law trespass “at least until the latter half of the 20th 
century,” but that its jurisprudence had “deviated from that exclusively property-
based approach” beginning with Katz.145 He observed that Katz merely had 
“established that ‘property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment 
violations,’ but did not ‘snuf[f] out the previously recognized protection for 
property,’” and that Katz “did not erode the principle ‘that, when the Government 
does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to 
obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.’”146 
The Carpenter Court did not use a property-based approach in finding a 
privacy interest in the “whole of a person’s movements,” and the dissenters 
accused the Majority of “unhing[ing] Fourth Amendment doctrine from the 
property-based concepts that have long grounded the analytic framework that 
pertains in these cases.”147 These dissents are most appropriately discussed in 
Part IV (when evaluating the third-party doctrine), but one dissenting view is 
helpful to discuss in this section of the Article. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in 
Carpenter offered “another way” of re-envisioning the Court’s cases under Katz 
using the traditional property-based approach, recognizing that it might extend 
more rights than the historically inconsistent results of the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” approach. Justice Gorsuch—having taken Justice 
Scalia’s seat after his death—seems to have taken up the late Justice’s mantle in 
restoring (or revolutionizing) that traditional property-based approach. 
144  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–07 (2012). 
145  Id. at 405. 
 146  Id. at 407 (emphasis omitted) (citing Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56 (1992) and United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
147  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2224 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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In the context of the facts in Carpenter, for instance, Justice Gorsuch 
called it “entirely possible” that “a person’s cell-site data could qualify as his 
papers or effects under existing law” despite that “the telephone carrier holds the 
information,” because various federal laws give customers “substantial legal 
interests” and “certain rights to control use of and access to” CSLI, including a 
federally created “private cause of action for damages against carriers who 
violate” those laws.148 But Justice Gorsuch lamented that “we do not know 
anything more” in the record because Carpenter had forfeited any property-based 
arguments by failing to raise them before the lower courts: “In these 
circumstances, I cannot help but conclude—reluctantly—that Mr. Carpenter 
forfeited perhaps his most promising line of argument.”149 
Some scholars see Justice Gorsuch’s opinion as “the most important 
aspect of Carpenter” for those “who have long been frustrated by the Fourth 
Amendment’s bizarre reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test,” with a bold 
prediction that “Carpenter represents the beginning of what will likely be a 
growing shift away from Katz and its progeny.”150 But in the context of DNA 
testing, could the property-based approach truly provide the same or greater 
rights to criminal subjects as that provided under Katz? That is the question for 
the remainder of this section. 
2. Property Interest in One’s Own DNA: Levels 1 through 5
Earlier, this Article argued the Katz analysis would yield a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” in one’s own DNA and test results because society was 
willing to recognize an objective expectation that one’s own DNA will not be 
plundered by the police, especially while it is in one’s own body or personal 
possession. It also suggested the not-yet-established proposition that a 
freestanding privacy interest in the “whole of a person’s genetic makeup” might 
be recognized as objectively reasonable by society in light of the balancing 
factors articulated in Carpenter. A property-based analysis could reach a similar 
result via a different route. 
To find recognition under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has 
traditionally looked to positive law and the common law to establish whether an 
individual has any property rights in a particular interest. In their joint Carpenter 
dissent, Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas explained how a traditional 
property-based approach would proceed: the Court would “first ask[] whether 
the object of the search—say, a house, papers, or effects—belonged to the 
148  Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
149  Id.  
 150  Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the Evolving 
Fourth Amendment, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 110–11 (2017–2018). 
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defendant, and, if it did, whether the Government had committed a ‘trespass’ in 
acquiring the evidence at issue.”151 
Using that analysis here, the Court would first identify the object of the 
search—in this case, a person’s DNA or the results of a DNA test—and then 
determine whether that object belonged to the defendant. Therefore, the question 
posed would be whether an individual has a property interest in their own 
biological cells and the results of testing done on those cells. Although some 
Supreme Court Justices have expressed doubt about property interests in 
“abandoned” bodily fluids,152 after Carpenter the answer to that question may be 
“yes” for three reasons. 
First, as a matter of positive law, some legislatures recognize property 
interests associated with DNA and test results, declaring them to be the property 
of the individual.153 For instance, Florida decrees “the results of . . . DNA 
analysis, whether held by a public or private entity[, to be] the exclusive property 
of the person tested.”154 These declarations of positive law—though currently in 
a minority of states—indicate that ownership rights in DNA and test results may 
be enforceable property interests. As Justice Gorsuch discussed in his Carpenter 
dissent, “positive law may help provide detailed guidance on evolving 
technologies without resort to judicial intuition” because legislatures “often 
create[] rights in both tangible and intangible things.”155 
Second, the genealogy companies themselves recognize that property 
and contract law ascribe ownership rights, as a general matter, to those users who 
submit DNA to their sites. For instance, according to the terms of service 
governing Ancestry’s customers, those who submit their DNA “always maintain 
ownership of [their] data,” and Ancestry must get their informed consent prior to 
151  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2259 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 411 (2012)). 
152  See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 92 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J.) (“I suppose the testing of that urine for traces 
of unlawful drugs could be considered a search of sorts, but . . . it is entirely unrealistic to regard 
urine as one of the ‘effects’ (i.e., part of the property) of the person who has passed and abandoned 
it.”). 
153  Colorado and Georgia recognize that “genetic information is the unique property of the 
individual” who is tested (and to whom the information pertains). COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-
1104.7(1)(a) (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (West 2019). Alaska legislates that “a DNA 
sample and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property of 
the person sampled or analyzed.” ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (West 2019). Louisiana 
explains that “genetic information is the property of the insured or enrollee. No person shall retain 
an insured’s or enrollee’s genetic information without first obtaining authorization.” LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 22:1023(E) (West 2019). Other states are considering similar legislation. 
154 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2019). 
 155  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). But Justice Gorsuch noted one 
limitation: “[W]hile positive law may help establish a person’s Fourth Amendment interest there 
may be some circumstances where positive law cannot be used to defeat it.” Id. 
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conducting research on submitted DNA.156 Ancestry’s terms of service also state, 
“You own your Personal Information, Additional User Information, and User 
Provided Content,” and they require their customers to grant Ancestry “the right 
to collect, host, transfer, process, analyze, communicate and store your Personal 
Information (including your Genetic Information) and Additional User 
Information” to provide the sites’ genealogy services.157 While 23andMe’s terms 
are not as explicit (or as generous to its customers), they do reflect an 
understanding that their users have rights (to waive).158 And publicly available 
genealogy sites, such as GEDmatch, also ascribe property interests to their 
customers. As GEDmatch’s terms acknowledge, “Raw DNA data uploaded to 
GEDmatch.Com (‘Raw Data’) remains the property of the person who uploaded 
it.”159 Moreover, GEDmatch recognizes that the owner of the results has the 
ability to remove them from the website at any time, thus preventing further use 
of the test results by the site.160 
Third, even where positive law does not expressly define a property 
interest in DNA and test results, courts may look to broader property-law 
concepts to determine the existence of that interest. For instance, in the 1990 
California Supreme Court decision, Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California,161 the court concluded a patient did not have a valid claim for the tort 
of conversion because he did not retain a sufficient property interest in cells 
removed from his body and used for research without his consent.162 The 
Majority did, however, recognize a property right in those cells still in the 
patient’s body, even though it did not find sufficient precedent at that time to 
establish a continuing ownership right once the cells were removed.163 
156  Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRY (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions. 
157  Id. 
 158  See 23andMe Terms and Conditions, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/ (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2019). According to the terms: 
Waiver of Property Rights: You understand that by providing any sample . . . 
you acquire no rights in any research or commercial products that may be 
developed by 23andMe or its collaborating partners. You specifically 
understand that you will not receive compensation for any research or 
commercial products that include or result from your Genetic Information or 
Self-Reported Information. 
159  GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86. 
 160  Id. GEDmatch explains the process to deny the site further use of the property: “A link or 
other means is provided within your GEDmatch account to remove your Raw Data from the Site. 
Alternatively, you can request deletion of your personal information at any time . . . .” Id. 
161  793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
162  Id. at 488–97. 
 163  See id. at 493 (“[W]e do not purport to hold that excised cells can never be property for any 
purpose whatsoever.”). 
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In dissent in Moore, Justice Stanley Mosk discussed the broader 
property-law issues that could undergird an argument in favor of finding a 
general property interest. He observed that “concepts of property and ownership” 
are extremely broad and include “everything which one person can own and 
transfer to another” and “every species of right and interest capable of being 
enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money value.”164 He 
explained that property refers to a “bundle of rights and privileges as well as of 
obligations”165—principally “the rights to possess the property, to use the 
property, to exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by 
sale or by gift.”166 Thus, even if the law “limits or even forbids the exercise of 
certain rights over certain forms of property,” other rights in the bundle might 
persist and “what remains is still deemed in law to be a protectible property 
interest.”167 He concluded that, in the absence of any authority negating the 
claimed property right in the excised cells, “the right falls within the traditionally 
broad concept of property in our law.”168 Justice Mosk’s argument, though in 
dissent in that case, provides a strong basis for the further claim that—even in 
the absence of positive law—a court could recognize a property interest based 
on evidence demonstrating the presence of some or all of the tell-tale “bundle of 
rights.” 
Here, as the terms of service from genealogy sites illustrate, the owner 
of DNA samples and test results may negotiate for some remuneration for the 
company to access test result data or compare their DNA sample to others, 
whether for research, patent development, or some other commercial purpose. 
That these companies require waivers from their customers, including waivers 
of rights in potential patents and other intellectual property products, indicates 
the DNA and test results have a marketable value. The weight of the evidence 
demonstrates that both the DNA sample and the results of a DNA test possess 
the characteristics of the “bundle of rights” associated with property ownership. 
For instance, by denying consent for research, the owner of the DNA test results 
can prevent Ancestry from using those results in research. And by removing data 
from GEDmatch, the owner can prevent the site from its further use. Finally, 
some broker websites already offer money for DNA samples.169 
164  Id. at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Yuba River Power Co. v. Nev. Irrigation Dist., 
279 P. 128 (Cal. 1929)). 
165  Id. at 509 (quoting Union Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 386 P.2d 496, 500 (Cal. 
1963)). 
166  Id. at 509. 
167  Id. at 509–10. 
168  Id. at 510. 
 169  Companies are already trading DNA samples for cash. See Ali Montag, This Company Will 
Pay You $50 for Your Spit—and Mark Cuban Just Invested $200,000 on ‘Shark Tank’, CNBC 
MAKE IT (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/13/mark-cuban-invested-200000-in-
dna-simple-on-shark-tank-heres-why.html; How Much Money Can You Make Selling Your DNA?, 
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Once the existence of a property right in one’s DNA and test results is 
accepted, the final step in the Fourth Amendment analysis is to determine 
“whether the Government had committed a ‘trespass’ in acquiring the evidence 
at issue.”170 The value of the property interest here—the DNA and its test 
results—are the contents themselves. Thus, any intrusion into the contents of the 
tests (which, in turn, reveals the contents of the DNA) could be considered a 
trespass. Conducting a search of a database containing the property of criminal 
subjects and accessing the raw data of their DNA test results to compare with 
other samples (for identification or other purposes) would be a clear trespass on 
the claimed property interests, resulting in a Fourth Amendment violation unless 
some authorization exists (such as a third-party issue, discussed in Part IV, or the 
presence of a warrant or warrant exception showing reasonableness). 
3. Property Interest in Another’s DNA: Levels 6 through 9
The prior section used a traditional property-based approach to the 
Fourth Amendment and established a more direct and perhaps stronger argument 
than Katz to recognize a privacy interest in one’s DNA and test results. But 
property law would not support the type of claim presented in Levels 6 through 
9 of the PAL chart, where the claimed property interest involves DNA belonging 
to another person. No accepted principle of property law would support the 
notion that one person “owns” another person’s DNA as a matter of natural right. 
Professor Erin Murphy has attempted to articulate a theory that might be 
applicable in this context, although it is mostly an argument under Katz. Her 
argument focuses on the rights of biological relatives who have been identified 
through a familial DNA search as relatives of a suspected criminal, and the 
impact on their lives and intrusion into their privacy by being associated with the 
suspected criminal.171 She suggests these family members might have a 
“protectable interest in the privacy of their half of the databased kin’s genetic 
code.”172 The theory would be that the family member “has a protected right not 
to have her own genetic information exposed, if you will, by the fact of her kin’s 
conviction. Such an interest could be likened to the joint interest held by property 
owners who share common space,”173 as in a situation where two condo owners 
ENCRYPGEN, https://encrypgen.com/how-much-money-can-you-make-selling-your-dna/ (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2019) (explaining EncrypGen is “poised to . . . tip the scales in favor of the 
consumer/DNA data holder by putting them in control of their personal genomic data and allowing 
them to be paid for sharing their DNA rather than surrendering it to the testing companies”).  
170  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2259 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
171  See Murphy, supra note 57, at 336. 
172  Id. at 336. 
 173  Id. Murphy goes on to argue that “the partial match search, and the inference drawn from 
the match itself, invoke constitutional scrutiny because they intrude on the legitimate expectation 
of privacy held by the relative in her half of the offender’s genetic code, and are impermissible 
because they do so without individualized or particularized suspicion.” Id. at 337. 
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in the same condominium share a common area in which they have a shared 
interest. If Professor Murphy’s argument has validity, then it could be applied in 
both directions. For instance, the criminal subject’s DNA would also be 
“exposed” to the public insofar as it is matched to the biological relative’s 
sample. The subject could then make the identical argument as the family 
member, in reverse. 
But the argument is problematic. The analogy of a “joint interest held by 
property owners who share common space” conflates the geographic areas 
involved. The analogy in the DNA context would not be two condo owners who 
share a common space in the same condominium. Instead, the analogy would be 
two condo owners who each live and own a condo in separate complexes, except 
that the common-area floorplans are identical in both condos. (Perhaps they were 
built by the same developer.) No property-law principle would allow the owner 
in one condo to have legal say in the affairs of the other condominium, no matter 
how identical the common-area floorplans. Therefore—to a much lesser extent 
than under a Katz analysis—the traditional property-based approach would not 
support an argument affirming a property interest in another person’s DNA.174 
There would be no personal Fourth Amendment interest at stake, and standing 
limits again would prevent the criminal subject from vicariously asserting the 
property rights of a third party. 
In sum, both the Katz and property-based analyses reach similar results, 
as discussed in this Part. Both can be used to put forward a plausible argument 
that the Fourth Amendment should protect the interests of a person in their own 
DNA and test results, even when those results are in the possession of others 
(setting aside until Part IV the issue of the third-party doctrine). And both 
theories should not be interpreted to support an attempt to claim a natural privacy 
interest in the DNA or test results of another person. 
IV. GENETIC PRIVACY AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AFTER CARPENTER
Part III of this Article concluded that criminal subjects whose DNA or 
test results were searched by the government likely would be protected by the 
Fourth Amendment with regard to their own DNA, but not so for the DNA results 
of biological relatives. Throughout the discussion, the issue of the third-party 
doctrine was deferred for later analysis, even though the outcome of that question 
could very well negate the privacy interest provisionally recognized above. Now, 
Part IV of this Article addresses the doctrine after Carpenter. First, it explains 
the history of the third-party doctrine and how the Carpenter Court cabined the 
174  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Majority’s 
“destabiliz[ing]” reasoning under Katz, calling it “revolutionary” that the Court would allow a 
defendant “to object to the search of a third party’s property”). Any theory that might allow this 
type of claim here would come under Katz, as in Carpenter, and not the traditional property-based 
approach. See supra Section III.A. 
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doctrine for future Fourth Amendment cases. Then, this Part examines whether 
the Court would use the same reasoning as in Carpenter to place limitations on 
the third-party doctrine in the context of DNA testing. During the discussion, it 
will analyze the doctrine from both a Katz-based and property-based approach to 
the Fourth Amendment. 
A. The Third-Party Doctrine and the Carpenter Decision
This section outlines the history of the third-party doctrine and how 
Carpenter might have changed that doctrine for the future where new 
technologies are involved. It explores the basis of the doctrine through the eyes 
of the Carpenter Court and examines the alternative positions of some of the 
dissenting Justices. 
1. The History of the Third-Party Doctrine
After Katz, with the Supreme Court expanding its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence to include “reasonable expectations of privacy,” the Court’s new 
direction had the potential to disrupt the effectiveness of law enforcement by 
placing restrictions on common investigative techniques (e.g., tracking money 
transactions made through financial institutions), surreptitious surveillance 
(e.g., tracking phone numbers dialed through the switchboard), and undercover 
operations (e.g., recruiting informants and wiring them to record incriminating 
conversations). Because none of these law enforcement practices involved a 
trespass on the property of a suspect, traditional notions of the Fourth 
Amendment had not triggered its protections. But all of that changed with Katz 
because defendants could now argue they reasonably believed their bank records 
would be kept private, the phone numbers they dialed would not be recorded, 
and their conversations would not be taped. 
These police techniques had one thing in common: the cooperation of a 
third party (a bank, a telephone company, an informant). Enter the third-party 
doctrine, which generally holds that, by disclosing information to a third party, 
“the subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment rights in the information 
revealed.”175 The Court first articulated the doctrine in United States v. Miller,176 
which upheld a police subpoena of Miller’s banks records, gathering “several 
months of canceled checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements.”177 By 
revealing his affairs to a third party (the bank), Miller had assumed the risk the 
bank might convey his personal data to the police.178 In explaining Miller, the 
175  Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 110–11 (discussing the third-party doctrine’s 
origins in cases such as On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952)). 
176  425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
177  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (explaining the significance of Miller). 
178  Id. 
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Carpenter Court listed three reasons Miller had no privacy interest in the bank 
records: he could “assert neither ownership nor possession” of the records 
because “they were ‘business records of the banks’”; the checks were “not 
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in 
commercial transactions”; and “the bank statements contained information 
‘exposed to [bank] employees in the ordinary course of business.’”179 It did not 
matter that Miller assumed the bank would use his personal information solely 
for a limited purpose.180 
The Supreme Court expanded the third-party doctrine in Smith v. 
Maryland,181 which upheld police use of a “pen register—a device that recorded 
the outgoing phone numbers dialed on a landline telephone”—because Smith 
assumed the risk when he conveyed the dialed numbers to the phone company.182 
In explaining Smith, the Carpenter Court detailed three reasons Smith had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed on his phone: a pen 
register has “limited capabilities”; it is doubtful “people in general entertain any 
actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial”; and telephone 
subscribers know “the numbers are used by the telephone company ‘for a variety 
of legitimate business purposes,’ including routing calls.”183 
After Katz, the Court continued to approve the police use of informants 
under an assumption-of-risk theory, even where the informant gained the 
defendant’s trust to enter into his home or recorded conversations wearing a 
wire.184 As Justice Scalia later quipped, “Abuse of trust is surely a sneaky and 
ungentlemanly thing, and perhaps there should be (as there are) laws against such 
conduct by the government. . . . That, however, is immaterial” because a 
person’s misplaced trust in a colleague is “not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly 
communicating with the authorities.”185 
As new technologies arose, courts expanded the third-party doctrine to 
approve police operations intercepting other information held by third parties: 
“subscriber information, the length of . . . stored files, . . . and a sender’s name, 
email address, and [internet protocol] address.”186 Even as the doctrine expanded, 
179  Id. (citations omitted). 
180  Id. 
181  442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
182  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (explaining the significance of Smith). 
183  Id. (citations omitted). 
 184  See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 
(1966). 
185  Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 94 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing White, 
401 U.S. at 749). 
186  Sarah Wilson, Compelling Passwords from Third Parties: Why the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments Do Not Adequately Protect Individuals When Third Parties Are Forced to Hand Over 
Passwords, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 17 (2015). 
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preserving the ability of police to continue normal operations, the Supreme Court 
warned that the doctrine had limits. The Court drew a key distinction between 
the permissible interception of “non-content” information—items noted above—
and the prohibited interception of “content” data, such as the substance of phone 
conversations, the content of messages, and “items that are not directed to the 
third-party intermediary (such as the [internet service provider]), but rather to a 
specific recipient.”187 And in certain instances the Court ignored the doctrine 
entirely due to other privacy concerns.188 
The third-party doctrine has been criticized as “dead wrong,” “a mockery 
of the Fourth Amendment,” “among the most maligned constitutional doctrines,” 
and “one of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital age.”189 Some worry 
about the “chilling effect” that “stem[s] from anxiety about where sensitive 
information, once collected, might flow.”190 Others believe the Supreme Court 
never articulated a “clear argument in its favor,” with some finding the doctrine 
to be “unexplained” or merely results-oriented.191 In United States v. Jones, 
Justice Sotomayor questioned if the doctrine could survive in a digital age where 
people “reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”192 Even a newly-appointed Justice 
Gorsuch joined the chorus of critics, contending the Court has “never offered a 
persuasive justification” for the third-party doctrine, and that it could lead to the 
demise of the Fourth Amendment in the digital age.193 
By the time of Carpenter, some believed the doctrine had outlived its 
usefulness. 
2. The Impact of the Carpenter Decision
Carpenter finally put the brakes on the third-party doctrine in the face of 
evolving technology, refusing to “mechanically” apply the doctrine to cell-site 
location information (CSLI), a “distinct category of information.”194 Yet the 
187  Id. at 17. 
 188  See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84–85 (invalidating state hospital policy where pregnant women 
“entrusted” their urine to doctors, who later gave urinalysis results to police if they tested positive 
for cocaine); see also Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 115–16 (discussing Ferguson). 
189  Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 113 (citations omitted). 
 190  Kiel Brennan-Marquez, The Constitutional Limits of Private Surveillance, 66 U. KAN. L.
REV. 485, 497 (2018). 
191  Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 113–14 (citations omitted). 
192  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 193  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262–63 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(“What’s left of the Fourth Amendment? . . . Countless Internet companies maintain records about 
us and, increasingly, for us. Even our most private documents . . . now reside on third party 
servers.” (emphasis omitted)). 
194  Id. at 2219 (majority opinion). 
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Court purportedly did not overturn the third-party doctrine, opting instead to 
“decline to extend” it under the unique circumstances of the case.195 
The Court gave two reasons for rejecting the doctrine’s application in 
Carpenter. First, the primary rationale for the third-party doctrine—i.e., only 
limited information can be gleaned from data such as telephone numbers or 
publicly negotiable checks—did not apply to CSLI, which “implicates privacy 
concerns far beyond those considered in Smith and Miller” and involves “seismic 
shifts in digital technology” that make it possible to track the location of 
“everyone . . . for years and years.”196 But in dissent, Justice Kennedy saw CSLI 
as “no different from the many other kinds of business records the Government 
has a lawful right to obtain” through the subpoena process.197 
Second, the Court concluded that the assumption-of-risk rationale—    
i.e, that “information knowingly shared with another” creates a “reduced
expectation of privacy”—did not apply because CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ as
one normally understands the term” due to the “indispensable” requirement to
carry a cell phone for “participation in modern society” and because cell phones
log location data “without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up,” thus defeating the notion the user “assumed the risk” in any
“meaningful sense.”198
One key argument made by the dissenting Justices was that the Majority 
had created instability with regard to the subpoena power.199 Justice Alito gave 
an in-depth analysis of the subpoena issue,200 while Justice Kennedy pointed out 
perceived absurdities in the Court’s holding.201 Justice Kennedy contrasted 
warrants, which allow “the Government to enter and seize and make the 
examination itself,” with subpoenas that “simply require[] the person to whom it 
is directed to make the disclosure. A subpoena, moreover, provides the recipient 
195  Id. at 2220. 
196  Id. at 2219–20. 
 197  Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy contended financial and telephone records 
pose as great a danger as CSLI, disclosing “how much money they make; the political and religious 
organizations to which they donate; whether they have visited a psychiatrist, plastic surgeon, 
abortion clinic, or AIDS treatment center; whether they go to gay bars or straight ones; and who 
are their closest friends and family members.” Id. at 2232. 
198  Id. at 2219–20 (majority opinion). 
199  See id. at 2247–57 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2224–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 200  Id. at 2247–57 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the Majority’s mistake on the subpoena 
issue in depth). 
201  Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (deriding the Majority’s view that “the Government 
can acquire a record of every credit card purchase and phone call a person makes over months or 
years without upsetting a legitimate expectation of privacy,” but that it cannot obtain “a court’s 
approval to issue a subpoena for more than six days of cell-site records in order to determine 
whether a person was within several hundred city blocks of a crime scene”). 
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the ‘opportunity to present objections’ before complying, which further mitigates 
the intrusion.”202 
Some scholars see in Carpenter the beginning of a broader rethinking of 
the Fourth Amendment, especially the third-party doctrine. The decision shows 
the Court is “willing to reconsider old doctrines that do not fit with the realities 
of the digital age,” and it “frees lower courts from the dead hand of Smith and 
Miller to protect data of comparable ‘depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach’ 
to CSLI.”203 Others are skeptical that Carpenter will have significant impact on 
the doctrine, recognizing that the Court’s holding is “fairly narrow and unique to 
cell-site location information,” due to the “ubiquity of cell phones.”204 Some find 
it unlikely the case will “extend Fourth Amendment protections to the acquisition 
and utilization of other digital identifiers and tracers, such as Internet Protocol 
(‘IP’) addresses and general forms of metadata.”205 
B. Applying the Third-Party Doctrine to Genealogy Websites
This section applies the third-party doctrine after Carpenter in the 
context of private genealogy websites, such as Ancestry and 23andMe, and 
publicly available sites such as GEDmatch, which has often been used by law 
enforcement to track down relatives of suspected criminals. It first explains how 
these sites work from the perspective of individuals handing over their intimate 
DNA data to third parties. Returning to the PAL chart from Part II, this section 
then explores whether the post-Carpenter third-party doctrine will negate Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests in the DNA context. Discussion will focus solely 
on PAL Levels 3 and 4, where individuals provide their own DNA or test results 
to third parties—either a private company, such as Ancestry (Level 3), or a 
publicly available website, such as GEDmatch (Level 4). 
1. Information Given to Genealogy Websites
Assuming individuals have a protected Fourth Amendment privacy 
interest in their own DNA and the results of DNA testing—either through a 
traditional property-based analysis or the modern Katz approach—the question 
then becomes whether that privacy interest is defeated through application of the 
202  Id. at 2228. 
 203  Michael Price, Carpenter v. United States and the Future Fourth Amendment, CHAMPION, 
June 2018, at 48, https://www.nacdl.org/Article/June2018-Carpenterv-UnitedStatesandtheF. 
204  Blake A. Klinkner, In Ruling that Cell Phone Tracking Information Is Subject to 4th 
Amendment Warrant Requirements, the U.S. Supreme Court Hopes Not to “Embarrass the 
Future”, WYO. LAW., Aug. 2018, at 54–55, 
http://digitaleditions.walsworthprintgroup.com/publication/?i=516222&p=&l=&m=&ver=&view
=&pp=#{%22issue_id%22:516222,%22page%22:56. 
205  Id. 
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third-party doctrine. To help assess this question in the context of genealogy 
websites, it is critical to determine what information is passed to these third 
parties and under what limitations, if any. This is so because scholars have 
synthesized two components to help determine whether the third-party doctrine 
will apply to private data conveyed to third parties. “First, all information must 
be voluntarily conveyed to a third party before it loses Fourth Amendment 
protection. Second, only third-party participants have the authority to consent to 
disclosure; mere intermediaries do not.”206 The conditions under which data is 
transmitted to third parties sheds light on the voluntariness and extent of sharing. 
The first area of inquiry in third-party doctrine scenarios looks at the 
“voluntariness” of conveying the data to the third party. Of course, individuals 
who spit in a tube and provide their DNA to genealogy companies such as 
23andMe or Ancestry, are voluntarily providing these companies with DNA 
samples. As discussed earlier, these samples are chock full of intimate 
information: data about one’s heritage, close and distant relatives, Neanderthal 
connections, genetic mutations, genetic predispositions to certain diseases and 
other medical information. This information could be used to predict life 
expectancy, future health care costs, and (science fiction aside) the necessary 
material to perhaps one day make an exact replica clone.207 Spinoff genealogy 
sites, such as GEDmatch, do not accept and test DNA samples from their users, 
instead allowing users to voluntarily upload (for free) the raw results of their 
DNA testing from companies such as Ancestry and 23andMe.208 
In addition to DNA samples, genealogy sites also collect other critical 
personal data from users. For example, during registration GEDmatch gathers 
the user’s “name, an optional alias, and email address.”209 Once registered, the 
user provides the site other personal information such as “sex, Y-DNA or 
mtDNA haplogroup, genetic sequence/information, Genealogy data, and/or Tier 
1 payment information.”210 Further, users may “engage in forums that are 
designed to be visible to other users, including comments and postings.”211 
Ancestry and 23andMe have similar policies.212 
Genealogy websites usually have policies to ensure that the uploaded 
DNA samples and other sensitive private information are provided by the owner 
206  Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 145. 
 207  See also Suter, supra note 122, at 739. Professor Suter contends it “is difficult to know with 
respect to any individual which pieces of their genetic information will be sufficiently distinct from 
others or informative with respect to susceptibility to disease, temperament, and other traits.” Id. 
at 778. 
208  See, e.g., GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86. 
209  Id. 
210  Id. 
211  Id. 
 212  See Ancestry Terms and Conditions, supra note 156; Privacy Statement, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last updated Aug. 22, 2019). 
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(or authorized user) of the data.213 GEDmatch manages this issue by requiring 
those who upload their raw DNA data to make certain representations to the 
website owners:214 that it is either their own DNA or else that they are authorized 
to upload it.215 If a user does not have specific permission to reveal other 
genealogy data, the user agrees “to privatize living individuals in your Genealogy 
Data prior to providing it to GEDmatch” by “changing the names of living 
individuals to ‘LIVING’ or something similar,” or else face the penalty of having 
the user’s data deleted.216 
The second area of inquiry in third-party doctrine scenarios is to 
determine whether the person releasing the sensitive DNA data is a “third-party 
participant” (and not a “mere intermediary”).217 Most genealogy sites have 
privacy terms to inform their users about the privacy that protects their uploaded 
sensitive data.218 For example, Ancestry explains it “does not share your 
individual Personal Information (including your Genetic Information) with 
third-parties without your additional consent . . . . [W]e will not share your 
Genetic Information with insurance companies, employers, or third-party 
marketers without your express consent.”219 GEDmatch states that “all 
Genealogy Data provided to GEDmatch can be viewed, searched, and compared 
213  See, e.g., Ancestry Terms and Conditions, supra note 156; Privacy Statement, supra note 
212; GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86. 
214  GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86. The user represents 
that it is their own DNA or else the 
DNA of a person for whom you are a legal guardian; DNA of a person who 
has granted you specific authorization to upload their DNA to GEDmatch; 
DNA of a person known by you to be deceased; DNA obtained and authorized 
by law enforcement to identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against another 
individual, where ‘violent crime’ is defined as murder, nonnegligent 
manslaughter, aggravated rape, robbery, or aggravated assault; DNA obtained 
and authorized by law enforcement to identify remains of a deceased 
individual; [a]n artificial DNA kit (if and only if: (1) it is intended for research 
purposes; and (2) it is not used to identify anyone in the GEDmatch database); 
or DNA obtained from an artifact (if and only if: (1) you have a reasonable 
belief that the Raw Data is DNA from a previous owner or user of the artifact 
rather than from a living individual; and (2) that previous owner or user of the 
artifact is known to you to be deceased). 
Id. 
215  Id. 
 216  Id. The penalty for violating GEDmatch’s policy is to “have their Raw Data or other 
personal information deleted without warning, their access will be blocked, and/or other remedial 
steps may be taken, including any legal action allowed under law.” Id. 
217  See Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 145. 
 218  See, e.g., GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86; Privacy 
Statement, supra note 212. 
219  See, e.g., Your Privacy, ANCESTRY (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (emphasis omitted). 
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by any GEDmatch user,” but users can partly protect their privacy by “providing 
an alias for either login or data.”220 
Most genealogy websites also allow their users to choose the level of 
privacy over their data. Even GEDmatch221—used extensively by law 
enforcement before and after the Golden State Killer breakthrough—updated its 
policies in May 2019 to increase the privacy rights of its customers. Under its 
revised terms of service, GEDmatch allows users to designate their data 
“private,” meaning it “is not available for comparisons with other people. It may 
be usable in some utilities that do not depend on comparisons with other 
DNA.”222 Data that a user designates as “public + opt-in” is “available for 
comparison to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch database using the various tools 
provided for that purpose.”223 Data that a user designates as “public + opt-out” is 
available for comparison to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch 
database, except DNA kits identified as being uploaded for Law 
Enforcement purposes. Comparison results, including your kit 
number, name (or alias), and email will be displayed for 
“Public” kits that share DNA with the kit being used to make the 
comparison, except that kits identified as being uploaded for 
Law Enforcement purposes will only be matched with kits that 
have “opted-in.”224  
Finally, data designated “research” is “available for one-to-one comparison to 
other Public or Research DNA. It is not shown in other people’s ‘one-to-many’ 
results lists. The Raw Data that you uploaded is not made available.”225 
Also, recall from Part III that genealogy sites recognize that the DNA 
samples, test results, and other private data uploaded to these sites generally are 
the property of the user. For example, Ancestry users “always maintain 
ownership of [their] data,”226 and GEDmatch affirms that “[r]aw DNA data 
220  See, e.g., GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86. The website 
warns that “any personally identifiable information you choose to submit via [its] forums can be 
read, collected, and used by other participants and could be used to send you unsolicited messages.” 
Id. 
221  Id. Law enforcement officials are concerned about the ongoing viability of GEDmatch under 
its revised policy. See Kristen V. Brown, DNA Site that Helps Cold-Case Sleuths Curbs Access for 
Cops, BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-
06-10/dna-site-that-helps-cold-case-sleuths-curbs-access-for-police (quoting a Parabon 
genealogist that GEDmatch is “basically useless now” to the police and the company’s “work on 
any new cases is significantly stalled”). 
222  GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86. 
223  See, e.g., id. 
224  Id. 
225  Id. 
226  See, e.g., Ancestry Terms and Conditions, supra note 156. 
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uploaded to GEDmatch.Com (‘Raw Data’) remains the property of the person 
who uploaded it.”227 With the fact of property ownership comes the right to 
exclude others from the data. Thus, in addition to privacy settings, some 
companies give the user control over what information is maintained on the 
website. For instance, 23andMe gives its users the ability to share information 
by choosing whether to “store or discard your saliva sample after it has been 
analyzed”; which “health report(s) you view and/or opt-in to view”; “[w]hen and 
with whom you share your information, including friends, family members, 
health care professionals, or other individuals outside our Services, including 
through third-party services that accept 23andMe data and social networks;” and 
to “give or decline consent for 23andMe Research;” and to “delete your 23andMe 
account and data, at any time.”228 And GEDmatch allows users to delete family 
trees and other genealogy data simply by “clicking on the ‘Manage your 
resources’ link on your home page.”229 
2. Data-Sharing with Law Enforcement on Genealogy Websites
In the context of police searches of genealogy sites, one other category 
of information is critical—the level of informed consent each genealogy site 
provides its users about how their private information will (or will not) be shared 
with law enforcement. This is particularly important to help determine whether 
users waive any privacy objections by expressly authorizing the sharing of their 
information with the police. If so, these would not be PAL Level 3 or 4 scenarios 
but Level 5, where express consent has defeated any potential privacy rights 
sought to be vindicated. Here, the private sites (i.e., Ancestry and 23andMe) have 
taken a different approach than some of the publicly available websites (i.e., 
GEDmatch), with the private sites expressly resisting law enforcement 
cooperation and GEDmatch being more cooperative. 
Ancestry and 23andMe notify their users that they will fully resist law 
enforcement within the bounds of the law. Ancestry’s published guidance for 
law enforcement data requests contains the following information policies: 
Ancestry will release basic subscriber information as defined in 
18 USC § 2703(c)(2) about Ancestry users to law enforcement 
only in response to a valid trial, grand jury or administrative 
subpoena. Ancestry will release additional account information 
or transactional information pertaining to an account (such as 
search terms, but not including the contents of communications) 
only in response to a court order issued pursuant to 18 USC § 
227  See, e.g., GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86. 
228  See, e.g., Privacy Statement, supra note 212. 
 229  See, e.g., GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86. The site 
provides a “link or other means . . . to remove your Raw Data from the Site. Alternatively, you can 
request deletion of your personal information at any time by contacting us.” Id. 
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2703(d). Contents of communications and any data relating to 
the DNA of an Ancestry user will be released only pursuant to a 
valid search warrant from a government agency with proper 
jurisdiction. If we receive a valid request under U.S. law to 
preserve records that constitute potentially relevant evidence in 
legal proceedings, we will preserve, but not disclose, a 
temporary snapshot of the relevant account records for 90 days 
pending service of valid legal process as described above.230 
When records are demanded via a proper warrant, Ancestry will “notify 
users of the request and provide a copy of the request prior to disclosure, unless 
[it is] legally restricted from doing so” by a “court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
2705(b) or equivalent state statute that is signed by a judge.”231 Significantly, 
Ancestry also provides the possibility of releasing information to law 
enforcement in “an exigent emergency that involves the danger of death or 
serious physical injury to a person that Ancestry may have information necessary 
to prevent,” if law enforcement sends an “emergency disclosure request” 
including the identity of the person in danger; the “nature of the emergency 
(e.g., report of suicide, bomb threat)”; the account holder’s “username and the 
email and/or mailing address”; the “specific information requested and why that 
information is necessary to prevent the emergency”; and all other “details or 
context.”232 23andMe has similarly strict policies that seek to avoid cooperation 
with law enforcement in most cases.233 
230  Ancestry Guide for Law Enforcement, ANCESTRY, 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/lawenforcement (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
231  Id. 
232  Id. 
 233  23andMe also reports any requests to users, when possible, and has this to say about its 
philosophy toward providing data to law enforcement: 
23andMe chooses to use all practical legal and administrative resources to 
resist requests from law enforcement, and we do not share customer data with 
any public databases, or with entities that may increase the risk of law 
enforcement access. In certain circumstances, however, 23andMe may be 
required by law to comply with a valid court order, subpoena, or search warrant 
for genetic or personal information. 
23andMe requires valid legal process in order to consider producing 
information about our users. 23andMe will only review inquiries as defined in 
18 USC § 2703(c)(2) related to a valid trial, grand jury or administrative 
subpoena, warrant, or order. . . . 23andMe will consider releasing additional 
account information or transactional information pertaining to an account only 
in response to a court order issued pursuant to 18 USC § 2703(d). In addition, 
23andMe will only consider inquiries from a government agency with proper 
jurisdiction. 
If a 23andMe user completes a valid authorization to disclose their Genetic 
Information to law enforcement, then 23andMe will disclose the information 
identified in the authorization. 23andMe will not disclose any identifying 
information about the authorizing user’s genetic relatives or connections that 
23andMe holds unless those users also provide express, written consent. 
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But requests of this type appear to be infrequent as of early 2019. For 
instance, Ancestry reported to the Associated Press (AP) that it had not “received 
such requests for genetic information in the last three years,” and 23andMe 
informed the AP that it had “‘never given customer information to law 
enforcement officials’” despite five requests from law enforcement about 
Americans’ data.234 In 2018, Ancestry reported it had received ten law 
enforcement requests for user information; it had “provided information in 
response to 7 of those 10 requests”; all requests were related to “investigations 
involving credit card misuse and identity theft”; it had “refused numerous 
inquiries on the basis that the requestor failed to obtain the appropriate legal 
process”; and it had “received no valid requests for information related to genetic 
information of any Ancestry member, and we did not disclose any such 
information to law enforcement.”235 
In contrast, GEDmatch has made a conscious decision to cooperate with 
law enforcement, but only in certain types of serious crime investigations. First, 
the site warns its users that the sensitive private data they provide to GEDmatch 
can be used for “[f]amilial searching by third parties such as law enforcement 
agencies to identify the perpetrator of a crime, or to identify remains.”236 It also 
informs users that it “may disclose your Raw Data, personal information, and/or 
Genealogy Data if it is necessary to comply with a legal obligation such as a 
subpoena or warrant. We will attempt to alert you to this disclosure of your Raw 
Data, personal information, and/or Genealogy Data, unless notification is 
prohibited under law.”237 
After the Golden State Killer case became public, GEDmatch made a 
policy decision to provide additional informed consent to its users to get their 
permission to allow those types of intrusions by the government, and it tightened 
the terms of that policy in May 2019. Its revised terms of service authorize 
(police) users to load “DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement to 
identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against another individual, where 
‘violent crime’ is defined as murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, aggravated 
rape, robbery, or aggravated assault; [and] DNA obtained and authorized by law 
enforcement to identify remains of a deceased individual”—although this data 
will now only be compared to the data of those customers who expressly “opt-
23andMe Guide for Law Enforcement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/law-enforcement-
guide/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
234  Fiza Pirani, Can Police Legally Obtain Your DNA from 23andMe, Ancestry?, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (May 11, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/national/can-police-legally-obtain-your-dna-
from-23andme-ancestry/8eZ24WN7VisoQiHAFbcmjP/. See, e.g., 23andMe Guide for Law 
Enforcement, supra note 233. 
235  Ancestry 2018 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). 
236  See, e.g., GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86. 
237  Id. 
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in” to such comparisons.238 This was the technique the police used in the Golden 
State Killer case—creating a false profile with the unknown DNA evidence and 
loading it up to GEDmatch in search of relatives and then creating a family tree. 
3. Applying the Third-Party Doctrine after Carpenter
In light of the genealogy sites’ privacy policies and informed consent 
regarding cooperation with (or resistance to) law enforcement, the final question 
to consider is whether, after Carpenter, the third-party doctrine should be applied 
to negate Fourth Amendment privacy interests possessed by individuals in their 
own DNA and test results (i.e., PAL Levels 3 or 4). This section will address 
each of those scenarios in turn. 
Before diving in, consider the analysis prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Carpenter v. United States. Prior to that case, the typical third-party 
analysis would have first noted that users have provided their own personal DNA 
data “voluntarily” to a third party and that it is the actual “third-party 
participants” (i.e., the genealogy companies) that are distributing the users’ DNA 
data to the police.239 This would weigh in favor of applying the third-party 
doctrine. Then, the analysis would have observed that users of genealogy sites 
“assumed the risk” when they gave their sensitive private data to a third party, 
taking the chance that the genealogy companies might “betray” them by giving 
that private data to the police to search. For some, that might be the end of the 
analysis because any “reasonable” expectation of privacy under Katz became 
unreasonable once the user assumed the risk of entrusting their data to a third 
party. 
But it is worth pausing a moment to recognize that, even in a pre-
Carpenter world, the Supreme Court had drawn a distinction between 
“non-content” information (e.g., telephone numbers, addresses) and “content” 
data (e.g., substance of phone conversations, content of letters).240 Indeed, Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent in Carpenter—while defending the third-party doctrine on its 
face—acknowledged that the doctrine had traditionally accepted limits: it “may 
not apply when the Government obtains the modern-day equivalents of an 
individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’ even when those papers or effects are held 
by a third party.”241 Of course, some “content” disclosures are traditionally 
covered by the third-party doctrine, such as the bank papers in Miller. But that is 
because those documents “were ‘negotiable instruments’ that were ‘to be used in 
commercial transactions.’ The third-party doctrine thus recognizes two 
238  Id. 
239  Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 145. 
240  See Wilson, supra note 186, at 17. 
 241  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2230 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (letters held by mail carrier); United States v. Warshak, 
631 F.3d 266, 283–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (e-mails held by Internet service provider)). 
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distinctions—one between content and non-content and one between personal 
communications and business records.”242 
With that caveat, one might have argued, even before Carpenter, that 
giving up the content of one’s DNA test is more like the substance of a letter 
(“content”) than mere addressing information (“non-content”). Also, a DNA test 
result is not the kind of commercial “business record” held by a bank as part of 
a negotiable-instruments framework, but more like a personal communication 
(perhaps a biological diary). And, before Carpenter, the analysis likely would 
have led to a discussion of Maryland v. King’s distinction that searching “junk 
DNA” for mere identification information is more like recording telephone 
numbers than the substance of a telephone call (assuming the police only use the 
junk DNA for its identification purposes).243 More on that below. 
Enter Carpenter. Recall that the Carpenter Court articulated two reasons 
not to extend the third-party doctrine to the collection of CSLI: (1) the primary 
rationale for the third-party doctrine (that only limited information can be 
gleaned from data such as telephone numbers) did not apply due to the nature of 
CSLI, which made it possible to track everyone’s location for years;244 and, (2) 
the assumption-of-risk rationale did not apply because CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ 
as one normally understands the term” due to the “indispensable” requirement to 
carry a cell phone for “participation in modern society” and because cell phones 
log location data “without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond 
powering up,” thus defeating the notion the user “assumed the risk” in any 
“meaningful sense.”245 Each of these rationales will be applied below in the DNA 
context. 
First, are DNA and test-result data more like CSLI or more like 
telephone numbers and business records, the items to which the third-party 
doctrine was intended to apply? For the reasons discussed in Parts II and III, 
DNA information is more like CSLI, given its ability to store immense amounts 
of intimate data. But this leads back to the Court’s analysis in King, which has 
been accepted by lower courts as the proper distinction when the government 
uses CODIS to search “junk DNA” (with no known coding functions) for the 
sole purpose of identifying a person.246 Recall, however, that private genealogy 
companies go beyond the purposes and techniques used in CODIS to merely 
identify suspects. These services also look deep into heritage, health, and 
research. Further, genealogy searches work differently than CODIS, as Ancestry 
explained when discussing its “autosomal DNA test,” which surveys “a person’s 
242  Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 117–18. 
 243  See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464 (2013) (reasoning that “CODIS loci come from 
noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee” and are not tested 
for that purpose). 
244  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20. 
245  Id. at 2220. 
246  See King, 569 U.S. at 464. 
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entire genome at over 700,000 locations.”247 Thus, it seems fair to say—
assuming the police truly are seeking the contents of a DNA test result contained 
on a genealogy site—that this presents a distinguishable situation from King. If 
the police seek “content data” within DNA or in test results generated by a 
genealogy company, then the first rationale for the third-party doctrine seems 
inapplicable, as in Carpenter. 
But one might still want to argue as in King that, even considering the 
additional data in genealogy databases, the police are not interested in any of that 
data and merely want to find a suspect’s relatives for identification purposes. 
Thus, perhaps this search is exactly like King, even though it takes place outside 
of CODIS. But even if it were true that the police did not seek this additional 
data, the problem with that position is it minimizes King’s reliance on the search 
occurring in the “junk” portion of DNA, and also that the government sincerely 
could argue CODIS existed only for identification purposes. With private 
databases, neither of those conditions is true. Searches used by private databases 
go beyond junk DNA, and the databases themselves exist for many more 
functions in addition to identification. King is entirely distinguishable. 
The second inquiry asks whether the assumption-of-risk rationale 
applies to DNA data, or whether that rationale falls away as it did in Carpenter 
because CSLI was not “voluntarily” given. Here, the argument in favor of 
applying the third-party doctrine is stronger than in Carpenter. Unlike CSLI, 
there is nothing “indispensable” to modern society in giving one’s DNA data to 
a genealogy company. One might argue that the genealogy boom has made it so 
that everyone does and should want to know their heritage and the identity of 
their biological relatives, but this still seems a far distance removed from the cell-
phone situation. (Perhaps one day the DNA issue will permeate as thoroughly as 
cell phones, but that remains to be seen.) 
Also, unlike with CSLI, users take several deliberate “affirmative acts” 
before their private data is placed in the hands of a third party. This is not a 
situation where one’s DNA is automatically uploaded to a database when one 
“powers up,” as with CSLI. Indeed, based on the privacy policies described 
earlier, users have full control over their data. Not only do they choose to spit in 
a tube and mail it to 23andMe, they also choose to upload those results on 
websites, to upload additional personal information, to make their data 
searchable by other users, and to delete (or keep) their data on the website. 
Everything about the process is deliberate, including the reading and 
acknowledging of terms of service and privacy statements. 
Thus, under the second rationale discussed in Carpenter, a much 
stronger argument can be made that DNA users have “assumed the risk” that a 
third party would betray them and open their data to a police search, regardless 
of what the privacy policies say. Recall that those policies were premised on the 
understanding that law enforcement could access DNA data with an 
247  AncestryDNA - Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 83. 
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administrative warrant of the type authorized by the Stored Communications 
Act, which uses a standard less than Fourth Amendment probable cause. Unlike 
CSLI data, the DNA data turned over to genealogy websites appears more suited 
to the traditional assumption-of-risk analysis that is central to the third-party 
doctrine. 
Perhaps this analysis justifies applying the third-party doctrine in Level 
3 scenarios, despite Ancestry and 23andMe’s insistence that they will not turn 
over one’s data to the police. And surely this analysis justifies applying the 
third-party doctrine in Level 4 scenarios, where companies such as GEDmatch 
have openly stated they will share the information with law enforcement for 
familial searching purposes and that they have authorized the police to load up 
DNA samples on their site to help solve serious crimes. That is a classic 
assumption-of-risk scenario. 
But before concluding that the third-party doctrine will defeat whatever 
potential Fourth Amendment privacy interest was recognized above in Part III, 
one other item must be discussed. Recall that the third-party doctrine was 
designed to deal with the modern Katz approach to “reasonable expectations of 
privacy.” Would the doctrine similarly defeat a traditional property-based 
approach, as Justice Gorsuch articulated in his dissent in Carpenter? Or is this a 
situation where the property-rights approach provides greater privacy protections 
than Katz? 
In his dissent in Carpenter, Justice Gorsuch argued that 
the fact that a third party has access to or possession of your 
papers and effects does not necessarily eliminate your interest in 
them. Ever hand a private document to a friend to be returned? 
Toss your keys to a valet at a restaurant? Ask your neighbor to 
look after your dog while you travel? You would not expect the 
friend to share the document with others; the valet to lend your 
car to his buddy; or the neighbor to put Fido up for adoption. 
Entrusting your stuff to others is a bailment.248 
He contended that a “bailee normally owes a legal duty to keep the item safe, 
according to the terms of the parties’ contract if they have one, and according to 
the ‘implication[s] from their conduct’ if they don’t.”249 He argued that a person 
may not lose their Fourth Amendment interest in the contents of their data just 
because they entrust it to a third party: “Whatever may be left of Smith and 
248  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Gorsuch explained that a bailment 
is the “delivery of personal property by one person (the bailor) to another (the bailee) who holds 
the property for a certain purpose.” Id. at 2268–69 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (10th ed. 
2014); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 2, at 2 (1832) (“[A] bailment is a 
delivery of a thing in trust for some special object or purpose, and upon a contract, expressed or 
implied, to conform to the object or purpose of the trust.”)). 
249  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268–69 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 36, 
at 468–69 (2017)). 
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Miller, few doubt that e-mail should be treated much like the traditional mail it 
has largely supplanted—as a bailment in which the owner retains a vital and 
protected legal interest.”250 
In the Level 3 scenario with Ancestry and 23andMe, considering the 
types of contracts into which users enter (including the companies’ 
law-enforcement-resistant provisions), and in light of the very real property 
interest that a person has in one’s own DNA and test results, it would seem 
Justice Gorsuch’s property-based approach would permit Fourth Amendment 
protection. Not only is a protected property interest at stake, but the owner of the 
property has merely created a bailment with the genealogy companies to hold the 
DNA data in trust for as long as the owner wishes to keep it with them. A trespass 
on that data is still a trespass on a current property interest owned by the user, 
and hence a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Still, a different result is 
probably reached in the Level 4 scenario with GEDmatch, where the owner of 
the data has expressly agreed by contract to open up their DNA data to search by 
law enforcement (unless perhaps the police exceed the bounds of the licensed 
search in the GEDmatch contract with the user). In that case, the owner has 
licensed the search. 
In sum, considering the Level 3 and 4 scenarios where the DNA owner 
entrusts data to a third-party genealogy company, any expectation of privacy 
recognized in a Katz analysis likely is extinguished by the third-party doctrine. 
Although DNA data is immense, as with CSLI, the assumption-of-risk rationale 
significantly undergirding that doctrine provides a valid basis to apply the 
doctrine. But, under a traditional property-based approach, the third-party 
doctrine likely would not defeat the protected property interests in a Level 3 
scenario, although a search might still be proper in a Level 4 scenario due to 
contract licensing terms. In either event, because Part III concluded one does not 
have a protected Fourth Amendment interest in the DNA or test results of a 
biological relative, nothing in that Amendment would prevent police from 
searching the DNA results of a criminal subject’s biological relatives to find an 
identity match. 
V. FUTURE ALTERNATIVES TO PROTECT GENETIC PRIVACY AFTER
CARPENTER 
This Article has identified areas where the Fourth Amendment does and 
does not protect an individual’s DNA and test results submitted to private 
genealogy websites. While, after Carpenter, there is a plausible chance the U.S. 
Constitution will sometimes prevent law enforcement from searching those 
250  Id. at 2269. Gorsuch also doubted that “complete ownership or exclusive control of property 
is always a necessary condition” under the Fourth Amendment because, “[w]here houses are 
concerned, for example, individuals can enjoy Fourth Amendment protection without fee simple 
title. Both the text of the Amendment and the common law rule support that conclusion.” Id.  
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databases without probable cause, it is likely that any protection would not 
extend beyond an individual’s right to protect their own test results from 
unlawful search. So what protections exist to regulate police familial searches of 
the DNA results of biological relatives? In Part V, this Article briefly comments 
on the current state of the law and the need for further protections. It then offers 
some preliminary thoughts to be pursued in future articles on potential legislative 
solutions to protect individual privacy in this area. 
A. The Need for Protection
The lightning-paced evolution of DNA technology has led to greater and 
sooner advances in DNA research than previously expected. Even as NDIS and 
other law enforcement DNA databases expand, advances in technology make 
future DNA testing cheaper and more accessible. The advent of “touch DNA” 
now allows law enforcement to “obtain full forensic DNA profiles from 
exceedingly small amounts of biological material” such as “skin cells shed when 
touching objects” like “the handle of a gun, the portion of a torn screen touched 
by an intruder, a brick used to break a window in a burglary, or the steering wheel 
of a stolen vehicle.”251 The use of Rapid DNA analysis has also opened the 
possibility for local DNA processing without resort to crime labs.252 
And the capability to exploit these DNA databases is growing daily. 
Researchers in October 2018 concluded that police could use private genealogy 
databases to identify crime suspects with increasing accuracy, and that “about 
60% of the searches for individuals of European-descent will result in a third 
cousin or closer match[.]”253 In a different study released the same month, 
researchers concluded that an individual’s DNA (or the DNA of a relative) 
contained in certain genealogy databases could be identified by linking that data 
“to a CODIS profile, and vice versa, in a manner not intended in the context of 
either database examined in isolation,” which “could expose relatives of the 
251  Kreag, supra note 72, at 1504. 
 252  Id. (noting the development of “a stand-alone, fully-automated DNA processing machine 
that can process a biological sample and obtain a forensic DNA profile in ninety minutes”). 
253  Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial 
Searches, SCIENCE (Oct. 11, 2018), 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2018/10/10/science.aau4832 (study led by chief 
science officer at the genealogy company, MyHeritage, using “genomic data of 1.28 million 
individuals tested with consumer genomics”); see also Rob Stein, Easy DNA Identifications with 
Genealogy Databases Raise Privacy Concerns, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 11, 2018, 3:58 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/10/11/656268742/easy-dna-identifications-with-
genealogy-databases-raise-privacy-concerns (quoting Erlich as saying that “each person in this 
database is a beacon that illuminates hundreds of distant relatives. So it’s enough to have your third 
cousin or your second cousin once-removed in these databases to actually identify you.”). 
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participant to forensic investigation; moreover, phenotypes of a relative could 
potentially be identifiable from a forensic profile.”254 
As these capabilities grow, the potential for indiscriminate and 
unchecked police use of private DNA databases to identify criminals should be 
a concern for those who care about privacy. As Justice Scalia warned in King, 
the government could solve more crimes by taking DNA from “anyone who flies 
on an airplane . . . , applies for a driver’s license, or attends a public school. 
Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt [our 
Founders] would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal 
inspection.”255 Yet that is exactly what millions of Americans have done 
voluntarily—opened their mouths for inspection and for cataloguing in a private 
database, perhaps unaware that the government could exploit that act for solving 
crime. 
Some scholars have argued that police DNA searches, especially familial 
searches, “should be forbidden because they embody the very presumptions that 
our constitutional and evidentiary rules have long endeavored to counteract: guilt 
by association, racial discrimination, propensity, and even biological 
determinism.”256 They worry about the impact of these searches on innocent 
relatives of suspects, on unfairly targeted racial minorities,257 and on those whose 
privacy will be invaded by the inevitable inaccuracies in testing DNA samples 
recovered from a crime scene.258 As this Article noted in its introduction, even 
the Golden State Killer investigation first swabbed two false leads before finding 
a true match. What impact does that have on the life of the person who has fallen 
under a cloud of suspicion for some period of time? 
Legislatures have taken some action in the past decade to deal with 
issues related to DNA testing and research. And though some states have passed 
laws that “prohibit genetic discrimination by health insurers and employers,” 
those laws often include exceptions for law enforcement purposes, and none 
254  Jaehee Kim et al., Statistical Detection of Relatives Typed with Disjoint Forensic and 
Biomedical Loci, 175 CELL 848, 848–49 (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.cell.com/cell/pdf/S0092-
8674(18)31180-2.pdf; see also Stein, supra note 253 (discussing the study). 
255  Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
256  Murphy, supra note 57, at 304. 
 257  Va. to Use Familial DNA in Criminal Investigations, DENVER POST (Mar. 21, 2011), 
https://www.denverpost.com/2011/03/21/va-to-use-familial-dna-in-criminal-investigations/ 
(discussing Maryland’s decision in 2008 to ban familial searches using its DNA database because 
it would have put half the state’s African-American population under possible surveillance because 
of the disproportionate number of black men who are subject to arrest). 
258  See Erin Murphy, The Art in the Science of DNA: A Layperson’s Guide to the Subjectivity 
Inherent in Forensic DNA Typing, 58 EMORY L.J. 489, 497 (2008); see also Strutin, supra note 6, 
at 347 (explaining that “every stage in the collection, profiling, databanking and analysis of DNA 
evidence can be subject to human error, mechanical error, computer error, statistical error, false 
positives and cognitive biases”). 
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provide protections regarding familial searching.259 Following the lead of 
scholars and scientists, some legislatures have considered bills modeled on the 
Genetic Privacy Act proposed by a group of bioethicists,260 and state and federal 
governments have started to provide protection in the employment 
discrimination context.261 But none of those laws address the privacy concerns 
raised by law enforcement searches of genealogy databases.262 
Nor do current privacy-based laws—such as wiretapping statutes, the 
Stored Communications Act, or HIPAA—provide answers to this problem. 
Professor Natalie Ram summarizes the current lack of regulation in this area: 
In other contexts, Congress has acted to create statutory 
protections, so we have the Stored Communications Act, which 
gives certain privacy protections for your emails. But we don’t 
have any sort of analogous law for ordinary genetic data like the 
genealogical data at issue in the Golden State Killer 
investigation. We do have protections in some other settings: so 
your identifiable health information might be protected under 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and certain kinds of data used for 
research purposes can be eligible for other kinds of protections. 
But generally speaking, your genetic information in a 
commercial, direct-to-consumer website setting, there isn’t a lot 
of legal protection that’s obviously available.263 
More must be done. 
259  Gabel, supra note 58, at 30–31. 
 260  GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY (1995), 
https://web.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/resource/privacyact.pdf. 
261  See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ff (West 2019), 
which took effect November 21, 2009. State genetic discrimination laws include MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 111, § 70G(c) (West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.17020, 17520 (West 2019); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-551 (West 2019); and OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 192.53 (West 2019). 
262  For instance, the Genetic Privacy Act ensures that nothing “shall be construed to prohibit 
federal, state or local law enforcement authorities from collecting, storing or typing DNA samples” 
as authorized by law for the “limited . . . purpose of matching DNA samples in criminal 
investigations,” with restricted access to “authorized law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, 
defense counsel, defendants, accused individuals, suspects, and their authorized agents.” ANNAS
ET AL., supra note 260, at § 122. 
263  Mina Kim, Are Family Tree Sites Fair Game for Law Enforcement?, WBUR (May 2, 2018, 
8:39 AM), http://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2018/05/01/golden-state-killer-family-tree-sites; see 
also Ford, supra note 15 (relating Professor Suter’s position that patient privacy rules do not 
automatically apply to “genealogy databases—even the ones that use submitted DNA samples to 
check for potential genetic illnesses”). 
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B. Potential Legislative Considerations
In Parts III and IV, this Article provided an argument in support of some 
Fourth Amendment protections for suspects with regard to law enforcement 
access to their DNA test results, even those held by third-party genealogy 
companies and found on publicly accessible websites. But while there may be an 
argument in favor of that protection, there is little chance the Fourth amendment 
protects a criminal subject from the police search of DNA data belonging to that 
subject’s biological relatives. Yet there are compelling reasons for Congress and 
state legislatures to act to curb the potential for unfettered police practices. And, 
as with so many other policy issues, it should not be the role of the courts to make 
policy and constitutionalize the area of DNA testing when state and federal 
legislators are more than capable of addressing the problem. 
In United States v. Jones, Justice Alito commented on the need and 
desirability for legislative intervention to provide democratic protections against 
police overreach in the digital age. Noting the “concern about new intrusions on 
privacy,” Justice Alito expressed the hope this might “spur the enactment of 
legislation to protect against these intrusions.”264 He compared the situation to 
that of wiretapping after Katz, where “Congress did not leave it to the courts to 
develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law governing that complex subject. 
Instead, Congress promptly enacted a comprehensive statute . . . and since that 
time, the regulation of wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute and 
not by case law.”265 His comments echoed the Court’s thoughts a few years 
earlier, in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,266 
where it refused to apply the Due Process Clause to create a new substantive 
right of a convicted person to access a state’s DNA evidence, explaining: 
DNA evidence will undoubtedly lead to changes in the criminal 
justice system. It has done so already. The question is whether 
further change will primarily be made by legislative revision and 
judicial interpretation of the existing system, or whether the 
Federal Judiciary must leap ahead—revising (or even 
discarding) the system by creating a new constitutional right and 
taking over responsibility for refining it.267 
264  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
265  Id. 
266  557 U.S. 52 (2009). 
267  Id. at 74. The Court expounded on its concern about the need for refinement: 
The first DNA testing statutes were passed in 1994 and 1997. In the past 
decade, 44 States and the Federal Government have followed suit, reflecting 
the increased availability of DNA testing. . . . If we extended substantive due 
process to this area, we would cast these statutes into constitutional doubt and 
be forced to take over the issue of DNA access ourselves. We are reluctant to 
enlist the Federal Judiciary in creating a new constitutional code of rules for 
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Professor Murphy, in proposing a three-fold goal of closely regulating 
familial searches (i.e., “to minimize their intrusiveness, optimize their efficacy, 
and ensure their legality”), has recommended regulations over when such 
searches could occur, the technical parameters delimiting the scope of the 
searches, the databases subject to search, regulations following a potential 
familial match, and creation of structural oversight of the process.268 And 
Professor Jessica Gabel has proposed language for a statute involving familial 
DNA searching.269 
In the future, these and other proposals should be built upon to develop 
legislation that could provide a balanced approach to preserving privacy rights 
while not handicapping legitimate law enforcement efforts in this area. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment has evolved with the times, especially as new 
and unexpected technologies have revolutionized both crime and law 
enforcement techniques. This Article has explored the issue of warrantless police 
searches of private genealogy databases after Carpenter v. United States, 
focusing on whether the Fourth Amendment protects DNA test results—both a 
person’s own results and those of their biological relatives—and whether the 
third-party doctrine is viable in that context. It traced the roots of the Supreme 
Court’s property-based and modern Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
approaches to the Fourth Amendment and described the development of the 
third-party doctrine. Examining the Carpenter decision, it analyzed the Court’s 
modified approach—including its new multifactor balancing test—and the two 
rationales it employed in limiting the third-party doctrine with regard to cell-site 
location information (CSLI). 
Then, in light of Carpenter—and using both the traditional 
property-based and modern Katz approaches—it analyzed whether the Fourth 
Amendment would protect a criminal subject’s DNA data from the police search 
of a private genealogy database. It concluded that a plausible argument supports 
such protection under both approaches. But it also found a strong basis to reject 
any Fourth Amendment claim of a criminal subject in the DNA data of a 
biological relative. Next, exploring the third-party doctrine, it found that doctrine 
likely to defeat a claim of privacy under the Katz approach because the 
handling DNA. Establishing a freestanding right to access DNA evidence for 
testing would force us to act as policymakers, and our substantive-due-process 
rulemaking authority would not only have to cover the right of access but a 
myriad of other issues. We would soon have to decide if there is a 
constitutional obligation to preserve forensic evidence that might later be 
tested. . . . No doubt there would be a miscellany of other minor directives. 
Id. at 73–74 (citations omitted). 
268  Murphy, supra note 57, at 340–47. 
269  Gabel, supra note 58, at 53–56. 
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assumption-of-risk rationale would apply. Yet the property-based approach 
discussed by Justice Neil Gorsuch in his Carpenter dissent might still offer 
protection under a bailment theory, despite the involvement of a third party. 
Finally, it briefly set forth the need for legislative action to prevent unfettered 
police action in this area, and suggested areas for future research. 
With technology continuing to advance—and the genealogy boom 
driving millions of consumers to entrust to third parties their DNA and all of its 
intimate biological secrets—the Fourth Amendment should place some limits on 
police action in this area. The Court’s traditional property-based approach to that 
Amendment provides the best avenue for those limits. And where the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection ends, legislative action should begin in order to avoid 
continued invasions of privacy into one of the most sensitive storehouses of 
intimate data: the human genome itself. 
